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Chapter 1: Thesis introduction  
Capital markets are affected by information asymmetry when one party (typically the 
manager or owner) has relevant knowledge that the other party (typically the investor) does 
not. This may result in adverse selection, whereby potential investors mitigate uncertainty 
by progressively discounting equity prices as the level of information asymmetry increases. 
The adverse effect of information asymmetry on asset prices of large corporations has been 
studied extensively Leland and Pyle (1977); (Reinganum & Smith 1983; Myers & Majluf 
1984b; Clarke et al. 1999; Baker & Wurgler 2007), but its effects on small firms remain 
under-researched. This study explores the impact of information asymmetry on both the 
demand and supply of small-scale equity funding.  
 
Akerlof’s (1970) seminal literature on the adverse effects of information asymmetry on 
asset prices describes a hypothetical used-car market, where the buyer does not know if a 
given car is a ‘lemon’ or a ‘cherry.’ The buyer’s inability to discriminate between cherries 
and lemons results in a discounted price for the ‘cherry’ and a premium being paid for the 
‘lemon.’ Sellers soon realise this and offer fewer cherries and even more lemons for sale, 
which eventually lowers the average car quality. In the extreme, this could lead to market 
failure as the cherry sellers abandon the market.  
 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1976) apply Akerlof’s (1970) theory to capital markets. They conclude 
that in a poorly-informed market, the contingent price variability (volatility) leads to 
increased uncertainty about the intrinsic value of the investment asset. The increased 
perception of risk drives prices downwards, as predicted by Akerlof (1970). Figure 1.1 
illustrates the impact of information asymmetry on both equity price (solid line) and the 
amount of available capital (broken curve). It is evident that to compensate for risk, 
investors progressively discount equity prices as the amount of information asymmetry 
increases (Myers & Majluf 1984). The broken curve illustrates equity investors aversion to 






Figure 1.1 Impact of information asymmetry on equity prices and availability.  
 
The literature suggests two solutions to overcome market information asymmetry: 
signalling and screening. Spence (1973) developed a job-market signalling model whereby 
employees can signal their quality by acquiring education; this represents a credible signal 
that lessens market information asymmetry, because it is costly and cannot be mimicked by 
low-quality candidates. Applying Spence’s signalling theory to the capital markets, Leland & 
Pyle (1977) describe how a firm’s insiders can credibly signal their firm’s high quality by 
retaining a greater proportion of their shares. Alternatively, they can use compliant but 
respected intermediaries to signal their high quality. In contrast, Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) observed that those who do not possess good information overcome this adverse 
selection by screening good information from useless information. Potential investors in the 
capital markets seek a screening mechanism which enables them to differentiate high and 
low-quality firms in the capital markets.  
 
Although stringent exchange disclosure regimens reduce information asymmetry 
(Reinganum & Smith 1983), the reduction is not uniform across listings because boards of 




transparency (Reinganum & Smith 1983; Hoje & Yontae 2007; Abosede & Oseni 2011). The 
boards of smaller, tightly-held companies tend to be opaque, with the quantum of 
information asymmetry correlating with the degree of equity owned by their managers 
(Bowen et al. 2008; Abosede & Oseni 2011; Iddon et al. 2013). The small-firm market’s 
weak-form efficiency makes it price-sensitive to asymmetric information (Reinganum & 
Smith 1983; Orycaso & Rogers 2004; O'Shea et al. 2008; Ozenbas et al. 2010). This thesis 
focuses on small companies which provide a rich environment to study the adverse effects 
of information asymmetry on equity capital raisings.  
1.1 Research questions 
This thesis addresses three core research questions as follows: 
 
1. How does market information asymmetry impact small firms raising equity capital? 
2. What impediments do small firms face in signalling their quality to potential investors? 
For example, firms could use certification by intermediaries (Booth & Smith 1986), 
disclosure (Russell 2015), or retention of equity by insiders (Leland & Pyle 1977) to signal 
that the issue price is consistent with inside information.  
3. What screening mechanisms (Stiglitz 1973) can potential investors use to differentiate 
small firms of high quality from those of low quality? For example, can we identify a 
short list of criteria similar in principal to Ben Graham’s Stock Screener for identifying 
strong value stocks based on publicly-available information that would enable investors 
to identify high-quality small firms?  
     
1.2 Motivation 
The driving motivation was to bridge the gap between theoretical dissertations on the 
demand and supply for small-firm capital raisings, and the obfuscated reality of the equity 
capital-raising markets themselves. Personal experience reveals that professional capital-
raising practitioners agree with (Simeonov 2015), who perceives ‘the size and fragmentation 
of capital markets’ as a major obstacle to small-firm equity capital raising for both listed and 




emanating from earnings management, few studies have attempted to identify the effects 
of information asymmetry on small-firm capital raisings. Abosede and Oseni (2011) state 
that contemporary research on the financial impact of information asymmetry on small-firm 
capital raisings is inadequate, especially ‘in areas of equity pricing in the capital markets.’ To 
the best of our knowledge, no recent studies rebut this observation. 
This thesis’ findings will benefit small firms, investors, policymakers, and capital market 
makers by: 
• Facilitating small firms, both listed and unlisted, to signal their quality to identifiable 
cohorts of professional equity investors, thus improving access to capital which will 
yield improvements in productivity and employment opportunities. 
• Assisting potential small-firm investors by developing screening and selection criteria 
to assess the soundness of the financial performance projections of potential 
investments. 
• Influencing policymakers to legislate for new innovative sources of small-firm equity 
capital funding, risk mitigated by stringent disclosure obligations. 
The economic importance of this research is a key motivation. Excluding their small-listed 
counterparts, SMEs contribute 57% of Australia’s GDP (NAB 2017) and employ 4.7 million 
Australians (POA 2015). In terms of importance for the market makers, small-listed firms 
constitute 86% of ASX listings (Glennon 2017). Theoretical research on SME funding has long 
been an important journal topic, but tends to be essentially empirical in methodology and 
focused on working with large, readily accessible databases. This fails to capture the field 
reality. 
Further, we contend that empirical methodology does not necessarily capture the essence 
of the causal factors requiring remediation in an applied economic sense. To achieve 
outcomes that offer applied real-time solutions, directly relevant and current in-depth data 
must be painstakingly garnered from targeted populations. The data must reflect the hard-
edged detail of the research questions rather than a sanitised bulk elicitation. In an effort to 
achieve a more applied economic outcome, we depart from finance’s conventional 




In summary, the motivation for this thesis is not only to pierce the veil of information 
asymmetry surrounding SME equity raisings, but to launch an academic progenitor able to 




Clearly, a study of this breadth and scope will ipso facto suffer from certain limitations. The 
recurring limitation through the three constituent studies is sample size. While the two 
qualitative papers met the minimum sample size criteria set by Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007), and saturation levels were achieved, we were conscious that we were operating at 
the lowest acceptable level. 
 
Again, the sample size imposed by the small number of SEO-issuing companies on S&P/ASX 
ECI will be seen by some as a limitation of this study, but it exceeds the number of predictor 
variables required for discriminate analysis as mandated by Press and Wilson (1978). The 
number of responses per independent variable also exceeds Hosmer et al. (2013) minimum 
of the twenty observations per variable needed to achieve empirical validity for 
Multinominal Logistic Regression. The effective discriminant analysis-based predictive 
equation generated in the Chapter 4 empirical paper was tested on the minimum sample 
size advocated by Press and Wilson (1978) and Hosmer et al. (2013), but would benefit from 
testing across a much wider population. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The three papers that constitute this thesis explore the effects of information asymmetry 
across three different capital-raising structures: small-scale private equity (SSPE); initial 
public offerings (IPOs) on a secondary securities exchange; and seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) of small-cap companies1. 
                                                 
1 Small-cap refers to firms with a relatively small market capitalisation. The definition of a small-cap stock 
varies between stock exchanges, but usually refers to firms with a market capitalisation between $300 million 
and $2 billion. While the Australian Securities Exchange uses the term microcap this thesis used the generic 





Figure 1.2 depicts the adverse effects of information asymmetry on each of the three 
scenarios. Firms seeking public equity funding consider an IPO on the secondary board, the 
National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX), but potential underwriters and investors shun 
the equity-seeking firm because information asymmetry obscures its quality. The SSPE 
market suffers from a two-way effect of information asymmetry. SSPE providers cannot see 
or risk-mitigate investment opportunities, and the SSPE seekers cannot identify the 
providers. The ability of SEOs to achieve their capital-raising targets is also hampered by 
information asymmetry. Investors are denied a cohesive and transparent picture of 




Figure 1.2 Flying blind: three essays on information asymmetry and capital raising.  
1.4.1 Small-scale private equity 
Pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984) predicted that SME owners seeking external 
funding prefer debt over more expensive equity. However, Forsaith and McMahon (2002) 
found that high-tech start-ups, HGFs, and nascent HGFs regard equity funding with more 




positive attitude to external equity. Brettel et al. (2009) suggest the increased acceptance of 
SSPE emanates from a ‘perceived’ increase in the value of the firm which outweighs the 
negatives, including loss of control.  
We hypothesise that smaller, well-resourced Australian Private Equity (PE) firms may be 
pre-disposed to taking equity positions in HGFs able to demonstrate the necessary 
organisational core competencies (Laguna et al. 2012) needed to continue on their high-
growth value-added trajectory. This study addresses the gap in SSPE supply perceived by 
Forsaith and McMahon (2002) and tests pecking order theory for Australian HGFs post-
global financial crisis (GFC). A simplified summary of the study’s results is depicted in Figure 
1.3. We found that institutional funds would only take equity positions in high-gross firms 
(HGFs) through licensed intermediaries, usually PE firms. PE firms had no means of 
identifying compelling SSPE opportunities, whilst HGFs and their advisers were largely 




Figure 1.3 Effects of information asymmetry on SSPE.  
 
1.4.2 Small public listings  




financial literature (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt 2006b; Fatoki & Smit 2011b; Harjoto & Paglio 
2011; Paulet et al. 2014). This study addresses the gap in the literature concerning the 
supply of external equity available to fund small and medium firms. We confirm 
Scarborough’s (2012) contention that private equity firms follow rigorous screening 
processes, are very selective, and take equity positions in less than 1% of applicant firms. 
 
HGFs unable to access equity funding from private sources may access public equity via an 
IPO, provided they can meet an exchange’s listing requirements. The effort may be 
worthwhile, as the benefits of an IPO extend beyond access to capital. An IPO minimises the 
firm’s cost of capital and maximises its value (Brau & Fawcett 2006), improves borrowing 
capacity (Pagano et al. 1998), creates publicity for the issuing firm (Demers & Lewellen 
2006), enhances its reputation with customers, suppliers, and other influential third parties 
(Witzel 2005), and is a powerful tool for attracting key employees (Broude 1997). For 
businesses with a winning technology or product, an IPO may maintain first-mover 
advantage by providing sufficient liquidity to sustain product and market development until 
the technologies are established (Maksimovic & Phillips 2002).  
 
Most developed Western economies recognise the need for ‘junior’ stock exchanges that 
provide SMEs with cheaper and simpler listing requirements than mainstream exchanges. 
The NSX was specifically established to fill this role. Taken in that context, the NSX’s lack of 
visibility and poor performance is puzzling, especially when compared to its successful 
counterparts in the UK, the US, and Canada. For example, the NSX raised $A626 million and 
$A359 million for the financial years ended December 2011 and 2012 respectively (NSX 
2012). For the same periods, the UK secondary exchange, the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), raised $A6.88 billion and $A4.96 billion (LSE 2014).  
 
The NSX’s inability to perform its role as a listing medium for Australian HGFs has not been 
the subject of prior research. We find that the NSX ineffectiveness stems from lack of a live 
trading Bloomberg facility, high brokerage costs, a lack of underwriting support, and 
chronically thin trading. The NSX’s weak public profile made it largely invisible to HGF 




shortcomings are exacerbated by its lax disclosure requirements, which fostered the rise of 
the information asymmetry that masks the performance of its listings from investors.  
 
The NSX’s shortcomings are illustrated in Figure 1.4. Chapter 3 is a complete account of the 
study on the NSX’s ineffectiveness as a secondary exchange, and the causal factors thereof. 
 
Figure 1.4 Impact of information asymmetry on the NSX. 
 
1.4.3 Small-cap SEOs 
SEOs are regulated capital-raising mechanisms available to publicly-listed companies. They 
are primarily driven by the issuer’s short-term liquidity needs (DeAngelo et al. 2007a; Wen-
Ben et al. 2013). DeAngelo et al. (2007) emphasised this ‘survival’ motive, claiming that 
‘firms conduct SEOs to resolve a near-term liquidity squeeze, not primarily to exploit market 
timing opportunities.’  
We used Akerlof’s (1970) analogy of ‘cherries’ and ‘lemons’ in the used-car market to 
explain the influence of information asymmetry on small caps issuing SEOs. A preliminary 
analysis of the one-hundred forty Australian small caps listed in the S&P/ASX Emerging 
Companies Index (XEC) during our sample period reveals that while approximately 70% of 
the Index’s listings had issued an SEO in the past three years, less than 5% (the cherries) 




An extensive body of literature (Drejer 2000; McDermott 2003; Chen & Wu 2007; Hafeez & 
Essmail 2007; Agha et al. 2012; Edgar & Lockwood 2012) holds that organisational core 
competence is the primary driver of competitive advantage. We hypothesised that 
organisational core competence is a powerful signal of future financial performance 
measured by return on assets and abnormal returns.  
 
The first section of the study used fifty-three proxies to measure the predictive ability of five 
ex-ante SEO board-level core competencies, and tested them as signals of ex-post financial 
performance. The results were mixed and found little commonality between the predictors 
of return on assets and abnormal returns. 
 
However, the second part of the study produced a predictive equation for abnormal returns. 
Using a constant, plus a series of discriminative coefficient weighted variable metrics, the 
short-term abnormal returns equation classified cherries and lemons with a 74.4% accuracy. 
The long-term version, utilising the same stepwise discriminant analysis, but a different 
more extensive set of variables, classified cherries and lemons with a 95.3% accuracy.  
 
1.5 Contribution 
These three essays explore the effects of information asymmetry on Australian demand and 
supply of SSPE funding from both industry and equity investor perspectives.  
In the first study, we found that PE firms capable of taking equity positions in HGFs prefer 
investing in larger firms with less information asymmetry. The PE firms report that the 
boards of large firms exhibit stronger governance due to the presence of more independent 
directors on their boards. Financial transparency in larger firms is enhanced by compulsory 
external audits, and as a genre, they employ more sophisticated internal reporting and 
financial controls than their smaller competitors.  
Contrary to pecking order theory, we found a higher than predicted acceptance of equity 
funding as part of an HGF/SME’s capital structure. However, the acceptance was conditional 




grow the business. This need suggests that government policy should aim to combine 
academic and industry elements into a unified consultancy able to liaise between well-
resourced but passive equity investors and compelling HGFs.  
The first paper concluded that SSPE would be more attractive to PE firms if government 
policy mandated auditable financial controls on SMEs, especially now that simple cloud-
based accounting systems can be accessed and audited by government departments, 
including the Australian Taxation Office.  
The second paper’s findings, on the ineffective operation of Australia’s only secondary 
exchange, suggested that information asymmetry is a significant retardant to its operation. 
Firstly, the exchange requires a substantial improvement in the transparency of its 
admittance and disclosure requirements. Secondly, new government incentives, possibly 
tax-based, are needed to induce Australian institutional funds to underwrite IPOs for HGFs.  
The third essay investigated the impact of information asymmetry on small-cap SEO 
investment and short and long-term financial performance. To overcome the adverse 
effects of information asymmetry, we developed a screening mechanism to enable investors 
to discern ‘cherries’ from ‘lemons.’  
This thesis’s three studies will make a positive contribution towards mitigating the adverse 
effects of information asymmetry on the supply and demand of SSPE.  












Chapter 2: Small-scale private equity: demand versus supply 
 
Abstract 
Pecking order theory contends that corporate managers seeking external funding prefer 
debt to equity (Myers & Majluf 1984). Contrary to this contention, we found that a 
significant percentage (19.9% of generic SME and 53.8% of high-growth firms [HGFs] 
respondents) of Australian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) prefer equity funding 
to debt, and would seek equity funding if it were readily available. However, the preference 
for equity funding was conditional that the erstwhile equity funder bought business 
experience and expertise to the table.  
 
In exploring the supply side of small-scale private equity (SSPE), our study reveals a 
mismatch between supply and demand, with supply being virtually non-existent, even for 
those SMEs categorised as HGFs. In order to attract investment from private equity (PE) 
firms, SMEs need to meet stringent criteria, and our study shows that only 1-2% of 
applicants may qualify.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The transition from start-up funding to senior debt or equity funding is still not well-
understood (Engel & Stiebale 2014). A small firm on a high-growth trajectory inevitably 
exhausts all its available sources of property-collateralised debt funding. Few small HGFs 
are able to meet Australian banks minimum requirements for revenue and total debt 
service ratio to qualify for senior debt, i.e., debt secured solely by the firm’s assets (Schäfer 
et al. 2004). Small-firm equity funding is another option, but it is an under-researched 
alternative in academic literature.  
 
Given that governments focus on policies that foster employment, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development defines HGFs as firms with ten or more 
employees that generate employment growth of 20% or more for three consecutive years 




broad agreement that only about 6% of any given SME population meet this definition of 
an HGF, but concludes that they create the majority of new jobs (Anyadike-Danes et al. 
2009; Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Stangler 2010; Coad & Broekel 2012; Lopez-Garcia & 
Puente 2012; Mason & Brown 2013; Lee 2014). Daunfeldt et al. (2014) found that using 
employment growth to measure HGFs could be seriously misleading, as firms measured in 
‘terms of employment are not the same firms as HGFs measured in terms of productivity 
and their economic contributions differ significantly.’ This study adopts revenue growth, 
rather than employment growth, as the independent variable most likely to attract equity 
funding.  
 
The literature does not offer a definition of SSPE per se. The following is the authors’ hybrid 
literature derived definition of SSPE (Eid 2006; Lewis & Zalan 2012; Bertoni et al. 2013): 
SSPE is a regulated investment into the small proportion of SMEs that are demonstrably 
high-growth, or on the cusp of high growth with investment amounts ranging from $1-10 
million and a three to five-year investment timeframe. The SSPE investor is motivated by 
the prospect of a large capital gain on exit, which is usually affected by a trade sale or an 
initial public offering (IPO). 
 
This study focuses on the two principal actors in the SSPE capital market: the financial 
intermediaries (seen as smaller, more nimble PE firms); and HGFs seeking capital to 
maintain their growth trajectory. The study focuses on small PE firms because the modus 
operandi of large PE firms is unsuited to HGFs. Typically, mainstream PE firms (listed or 
unlisted) employ highly-leveraged strategies to buy out under-performing and/or under-
priced companies (Lockett et al. 2010). However, HGFs do not generate sufficient surplus 
cash flow to service the high costs of the debt leverage that characterises mainstream PE 
strategies.  
 
This study explores the supply of SSPE. The question is whether or not smaller PE firms are 
disposed to invest in HGFs, especially those HGFs possessing the strong organisational core 
competencies (Laguna et al. 2012) needed to continue on a trajectory of exponential 





The study also investigates the demand by HGFs for equity investment. Forsaith and 
McMahon (2002) and Brettel et al. (2009) provided some evidence that high-tech SME’s 
sought, but were unable to obtain SSPE. This study extends this work by examining the 
extent of demand for equity investment, the reasons for seeking equity investment, and 
the amount of equity offered. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Much of the supply-side literature concerns large PE firms seeking to take over listed 
companies, or debates on active or passive fund management (Chen et al. 2010). The larger 
firms focus on undervalued or poorly managed listed companies (Rath & Rashid 2016), and 
listed companies with ineffectual governance structures (Clarkson et al. 2016). 
 
Policymakers seek to encourage growth, innovation, and productivity. Reducing 
information asymmetry in capital markets assists to achieve these objectives. Evidence of 
SME’s restricted access to funding is well-documented in economic and financial literature 
(Beck & Demirguc-Kunt 2006a; Fatoki & Smit 2011a; Harjoto & Paglia 2011; Paulet et al. 
2014).  
The transition from start-up funding to qualifying for external senior debt or equity funding 
remains an under researched sequence of a HGFs life cycle (Schäfer et al. 2004). Long-held 
pecking order theory dictates that SME prefer debt to equity funding (Myers 1984). 
However, actualising this preference once the borrower’s real property collateral has been 
exhausted is difficult (Mac an Bhaird & Lucey 2007). Put simply, Australian banks view 
issuing senior debt to SMEs as high-risk lending (Schäfer et al. 2004). 
  
Senior debt is debt that has repayment priority over other less secured or more ‘junior’ debt 
(Welch 1997). Senior debt is secured solely by a charge over a firm’s assets and cash flow, 
circumventing the constraints imposed by limited real property collateral. Shafer et al. 
(2004) concluded that few HGF’s were able to meet the ‘big four’ Australian banks’ 
minimum revenue requirements (in the author’s experience, usually around $10 million 




restrictions strengthen the case for the SSPE funding of HGFs as an alternative to senior 
debt.  
 
Equity investment into risky but optimistic ventures is one of the oldest of human 
commercial activities (Kerr et al. 2010). The simplest contemporary manifestation of this 
activity is business angels, wherein wealthy individuals make small non-intermediated 
equity investments into closely held start-up companies (Sørheim 2005). Business Angel 
funding should not be confused with SSPE, as the structure of an angel investment differs 
significantly from the structure of an SSPE investment. The latter, theoretically at least, 
targets established firms with a proven management team and a high-growth history (Lewis 
& Zalan 2012; Bertoni et al. 2013).  
 
In summary, the capital structure of SMEs, while formulated on pecking order and agency 
theories, is heavily influenced by ‘age, size, level of intangible activity, ownership structure 
and the provision of collateral’ (Mac an Bhaird & Lucey 2007). Research on the capital 
structure of SME’s concludes that owners of firms striving for growth are less averse to 
ceding control and equity dilution than their status quo focused counterparts (Myers 1984; 
Holmes & Kent 1991; Mac an Bhaird & Lucey 2007). Figure 2.1 illustrates the financing gap 
faced by firms aiming for high growth. Figure 2.1 suggests a strategic role for SSPE in 
bridging this gap between start-up and later stage funding. Few previous studies had 
attempted to explore or solve this gap (Smallbone et al. 1995; Lewis & Zalan 2012). 
 




We hypothesise that information asymmetry inhibits SME’s/HGF’s ability to identify 
sources of external equity capital. The invisibility of SSPE supply may have distorted 
pecking order theory in a way that is analogous to the ‘discouraged borrower’s 
phenomenon’ described by Myers and Majiluf (1984). Forsaith and McMahon (2002) 
argued that if no ready source of external equity capital exists, why would SMEs/HGFs even 
consider making it part of their capital structure?     
The research question generated the following two hypotheses: 
H1: The demand for SSPE among SME/HGFs is greater than the supply.   
 
H2: SME/HGF’s demand for SSPE is greater than pecking order theory infers.   
2.3 Research design 
Given the nature of the hypotheses, a mixed-methods descriptive-inductive/prescriptive-
deductive approach is adopted in this study (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007).  
 
2.3.1 Supply side 
Quantitative methodology is inappropriate for the supply side, given the dearth of small-
scale institutional PE funds. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) hold that a qualitative 
approach can make a significant contribution to theory development when the key theme is 
weakly researched, as is the supply structure of SSPE.  
An extensive report on SME funding (Deloitte Access Economics 2014), commissioned by 
NSW Business Chamber, notes that the quantum of wealthy individuals investing in VC or 
SSPE is unpublished and unknown. The report holds that identifying Australian PE firms 
structured to provide SSPE, either directly or as intermediaries for large institutional funds, 
is difficult. The PE industry is well-known for its opacity when it comes to delivering 
performance metrics and reliable data to the public (Lewis & Zalan 2012).  
Willert (2008) collated a database of one-hundred eighteen North American managed PE 
funds employing 1926 investment professionals and managing an aggregated US$225 




billion dollar mega buy-out funds, ‘a strikingly large number (over 52%) of well-established 
private equity firms were relatively small,’ employing only two to seventeen investment 
professionals. In recent times, deregulation has improved the liquidity of the small end of 
the US Private Equity market to the extent that small IPOs have declined (Ewens & Farre-
Mensa 2018).We posited that the smaller firms described by Willert (2008) possessed the 
nimbleness and flexibility to make SSPE investments in HGFs. We sought their Australian 
counterparts as respondents to our study. 
Fifty-five PE firms are registered with the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association Limited (AVCAL). The investments undertaken by forty of the fifty-five AVCAL 
members are exclusively large-scale, but the AVCAL profiles of the remaining fifteen firms 
indicated a middle or lower-market orientation, and a willingness to undertake PE 
investments as low as $2 million. These fifteen firms became our supply side respondents.  
Employing the techniques advocated by Dick (2000), semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the CEOs or Chairmen of fifteen selected small PE firm respondents. The 
interviews were not recorded for two reasons. Firstly, many of the respondents were 
extremely sensitive to confidentiality issues and declined to have their telephone interview 
recorded. Secondly, it was felt that conservative, high-level executives may be franker with 
their responses if they knew that the conversation was not being recorded. The latter 
prediction proved true, as several executives disclosed relevant information that required 
editing to avoid identification of their firms. 
Extensive notes were taken during the interviews and transcribed immediately once the 
interview terminated. The transcriptions were condensed and ‘coded’ in the ‘open coding’ 
manner devised by Strauss and Corbin (1998). In ‘open coding,’ the researcher attempts to 
code or categorise each question’s answer to one of a number of emerging ‘essences,’ thus 
the progressive weighting of each code indicates the essences significance. In addition, the 
technique of ‘memoing’ (Glaser & Barney 1998; Dick 2000) was integrated with interview 
notes, tabbing any potential emerging hypothesis discerned during or immediately after 
interviews.  




• The age of the firm and its relationship with AVCAL. 
• The structure of the firm.  
• The sources of their investment funds. 
• How they sourced their acquisitions. 
• The methodology they employed to select and screen their acquisitions. 
• Whether they sought outright ownership or part equity in their targeted 
acquisitions. 
• Were they aware of potential high yielding investment potential in SME/HGFs? 
• What was their minimum investment in absolute terms and why? 
• Did they spread investments to mitigate risk? 
 
2.3.2 Demand side 
Australian confidentiality and privacy statutes prevent government agencies from releasing 
historical financial data on SMEs, even if the contributing SME sources are kept 
anonymous. A questionnaire was therefore deemed necessary to obtain specific data that 
measured the business profile of SMEs and HGFs against their demand for PE, but how to 
cost-effectively circulate such a questionnaire to a statistically significant sample of 
Australian SME respondents was an issue.  
 
The solution was to integrate the demand side SSPE questions into the NSW Business 
Chamber’s annual survey questionnaire, which is electronically administered to its 26,000 
members. We thank the Chamber for this accommodation. The Chamber advised against 
framing questions that demanded precise empirical answers, as prior experience had 
shown that their members were unlikely to undertake the calculations needed to answer 
them. However, the extensive demographic data elicited by the Chamber’s own survey 
questions enabled us to identify and separate high growth and potentially high-growth 
SMEs from generic SME respondents.  
 
The NSW Chamber’s SME members surveyed represented virtually all industries and 
ranged in size from self-employed up to two-hundred employees. A total of 1,090 




Statistical analysis was applied to the demand side questionnaire to measure the extent of 
the respondents demand for SSPE and identify the causal factors thereof.  
2.4 Supply side results   
Lewis and Zalan’s (2012) findings on the reclusiveness of the PE industry were confirmed. 
Potential respondents cited fear of breach of confidentiality as grounds to withhold 
interview consent, despite formal written assurances of anonymity. Thirteen of the sought 
fifteen AVCAL member respondents eventually agreed to grant interviews. The other two 
respondents were recruited from AVCAL member recommended family PE firms. A series of 
structured questions (See Appendix B) was put to each of the respondents in the course of a 
thirty-minute telephone interview. Seven of the fifteen PE firms interviewed had been 
operational for ten years or longer, the oldest for some seventy years.  
 
2.4.1 Structure of Australian private equity firms   
The Limited Partnership structures that characterise US and European PE firms are not 
recognised by ASIC, APRA, or the Australian Tax Office (ATO) in Australia. The only approved 
Australian Limited Partnerships are related to Venture Capital. These are structured as 
state-registered Early Stage Venture Capital Partnerships (ESVCLPs) and Venture Capital 
Partnerships (VCLPs) and attract significant tax concessions. A respondent, whose minimum 
investment was $10 million, commented, ‘I think some of my competitor’s VCLPs have more 
to do with Private Equity than VC. They are stretching it. The trouble is that ASIC-approved 
Unit Trusts come with a lot of expensive and complex regulatory baggage. We spend more 
time on governance paperwork than growing our assets.’ Another respondent emphasised 
the ASIC cap on the size of Australian VCLPs; ‘ASIC permits VC style Limited Partnerships to 
be extended to PE providing the total investment assets of the partnership do not exceed 
$250 million. If the total investment assets exceed $250 million, then the investments must 
be in the form of a Unit Trust.’ The same respondent opined that ‘further investment into 
start-ups and SMEs is being held back as a direct result of the current inconsistency in the 
tax rules that apply to the different classes of investors in VCLPs and their extension into 




Midway through the interviews, the 2016/17 Australian Government budget was released, 
flagging some form of limited PE partnership (a Collective Investment Vehicle or CIV) to be 
introduced for the income years starting on or after 1 July 2018 (Industry 2016). This 
proposal is aimed at reducing the onerous ASIC compliance load associated with Investment 
Trusts.  
As depicted in Figure 2.2, thirteen of the fifteen respondents relied on variants of ASIC-
approved Unit Trust structures to channel institutional and wholesale funds into their PE 
investments. The dominant typology was a branded unit trust-based fund. In this structure, 
each fund owned and managed multiple Special Investment Vehicles (SPVs), with each SPV 
housing an individual portfolio firm. Individual fund risk was mitigated by the diversity of 
investment and the quarantined SPVs. Only one respondent assigned a separate Unit Trust 
for each investment portfolio firm.  
 Figure 2.2 Model of a typical PE investment fund.  
 
Without exception, all respondents’ Unit Trusts were licensed by ASIC as wholesale trusts, 
thus avoiding the need to meet the far more complex ASIC and APRA regulations that 
govern retail trusts. A high-profile respondent with a legal background stated, ‘The 
compliance requirements of registered retail funds are very complex and expensive to 
implement. Consequently, retail investors are not part of our fund sourcing model.’ Unlike 
retail trusts, managers of wholesale PE Funds/Unit trusts cannot discuss or accept 
investments from ‘mom & pop’ non-sophisticated investors. Nor can they advertise or use 





Given the current prohibition in Australia of the simpler internationally recognised limited 
partnership model, the Australian PE respondents were still able to devise strategies to debt 
leverage their assets to advantage. The most utilised domestic strategy involved assigning 
debt to the SPV portfolio companies (the Fund’s liability was therefore quarantined within 
SPV). A veteran respondent observed, ‘It’s perfectly legal for a portfolio firm to take out a 
bank loan, and it’s made easier if the parent PE firm has high level connections with the 
bank.’   
 
2.4.2 Raising investment funds 
ASIC prohibits wholesale licensed PE funds from raising capital directly from the public. The 
PE firms are left with the choice between dealing with sophisticated investors termed high-
net-worth (HNW) individuals or institutional superannuation funds. ASIC defines HNW 
individuals as individuals able to produce an accountant’s certificate proving they own 
minimum net assets of $2.5 million, and receive a minimum gross income of $250,000 p.a. 
Some 56% of institutional PE capital is sourced from large Australian superannuation funds 
(Trends & Austrade 2010). A respondent summed up the current sourcing practices of nine 
of the study’s fifteen respondents: ‘Our sources are 100% institutional Superannuation 
funds. HNW individuals and Self-Managed Super Funds (SMSFs) are too small for us.’ 
It became clear as the interviews progressed that the five smallest PE respondents did not 
have the connections, track record, or access to the large compelling deals ($50 million +) 
needed to attract institutional capital. One of these five respondents complained that the 
restrictive nature of their wholesale fund licence ‘made it illegal to engage with licensed 
financial planners and hence made access to capital from large superannuation funds more 
difficult.’ Instead, apart from their own ‘skin in the game,’ the five smallest PE firms relied 
almost entirely on a zealously-guarded network of HNW investors. Three of these smaller 
respondents had been sourcing from the same HNW individual investors for more than a 
decade. Funding emanating from HNW investors is more likely to be measured in individual 




summed up a consensus opinion on SSPE: ‘That there is no shortage of sophisticated 
investor funds for a compelling well researched proposal.’ 
The outlier ex-mining firm PE firm adopted a different capital raising strategy. They used the 
weight of their ASX listing to issue a secondary equity offering to raise capital for 
acquisitions in a narrowly-defined industry sector. The outlier’s respondent observed, ‘We 
intend to operate as direct owners of the portfolio assets, as our objective is to be a single 
industry based firm. This strategy avoids us being seen as an investment firm pure and 
simple and avoids the complexity and onerous requirements of Unit Trusts.’ 
 
2.4.3 Taxonomy of SSPE investments  
The literature on characteristics and attributes that private equity firms seek when selecting 
targets is largely confined to listed targets where firm-specific characteristics differ from the 
unlisted targets that are the focus of this paper. Sought characteristics of listed targets 
include lower stock volatility and abnormal returns (Osborne et al. 2012), although as with 
the respondents to this study, long-term growth prospects are a common independent 
variable. 
Our respondents were selected on the basis that their published AVCAL profile suggested an 
ability to execute SSPE, albeit one respondent’s profile indicated that the firm invested in 
SMEs as a distressed asset. When later interviewed, all respondents were emphatic that 
compelling middle and lower-market HGF investment opportunities were scarce in 
Australia, thus justifying the generalist approach adopted by twelve (80%) of them.  
The twelve generalist respondents agreed that industry specialisation would generate a 
higher return on their investments, but claimed ‘Here in Australia we can’t get the 
comparative advantage of specialisation because there aren’t enough opportunities.’ The 
three that did take equity positions in a narrower range of industries, targeted industries 
that required sophisticated skills, included medical technology, nursing homes, IT services, 
and financial services (see Table 2.1). 
 





Legend:  WUN = Wholesale Unit Trust; MT = Master Trust; LP = Limited Partnership; LE = Listed Entity; SMSF = 
Self-Managed Super Fund; HNWI = High Net Worth Individual; INT = Institutional Superannuation Fund      
 
No respondent currently held a sub $1 million equity investment, nor did they appear 
motivated to do so. Various protean reasons were advanced to explain their lack of interest 
in taking equity positions in sub $1 million HGFs. The reasons included: 
1. The cost of due diligence in absolute terms was very much the same regardless of 
the size of the target. Thus, it was more efficient to apply this cost to a larger target 
because in percentage terms, it represented a lower upfront cost. A respondent who 
had previously worked for a very large US PE firm, and recently relocated to a much 
smaller Australian PE firm, commented, ‘the problem with small investments is that 
small $$ yield small $$ returns and small $$ fees but still requires a lot of time and 
frictional costs. In NYC at my $4 billion fund I had a team of 5 at my disposal and the 
ability to incur significant deal costs – even if the deal failed. Here in Australia doing 
small investments I can't afford significant expenses or the risk of dead deal costs, so 
I have to pick my deals carefully and do the work myself to contain costs.’  
The sole respondent who had experimented with sub $1 million investments 
advised: ‘We folded the trust three years ago – it only lasted three years – the cost of 
carrying out due diligence on small private companies far outweighs any significant 
capital gains, both in percentage and absolute terms.’  
No 
Age of 





  in Years Structure of Employees $ millions from Investments $millions $millions 
1 12 WUN         10 300 INT 6 10 to 100 10 
2 9 WUN         17 230 INT 9 25 to 50 20 
3 13 LP & WUN 17 n/a  HNWI 2 n/a 10 
4 14 LP & WUN 6 83 INT & HNWI 5 n/a 2 
5 5 LP & WUN 15 1,700 HNWI n/a 2 to 25 1 
6 77 MT n/a n/a  INT n/a n/a n/a 
7 39 WUN         46 1,975 INT n/a n/a ≥ 10 
8 1 WUN         3 n/a HNWI 1 1 to 45  ≤1 
9 18 WUN         15 650 INT & HNWI 11 1 to 5 1 
10 17 WUN         4 n/a SMSF 3 1 to 4 ≤1 
11 16 WUN         9 n/a INT  5 100-500 50 
12 1 LE 7 n/a INT & HNWI 7 1 to 4 1 
13 8 WUN         2 n/a HNWI 1 3 to 10 3 
14 3 WUN         2 n/a HNWI 1 2 to 20 2 




2. The information asymmetry that typifies small firms is often exacerbated by the 
owner’s manipulation of profits by opaque journal entries, basic accounting systems 
running unlocked without an audit trail, out of date records and general lack of 
internal controls. A respondent contributed that, ‘Auditing small firms and their 
primitive accounting systems is risky and costly.’ 
3. Growth by ‘build and buy strategies’ can be difficult to implement. A larger 
respondent observed, ‘Buy and build is a furphy with really small acquisitions. Small 
firms can’t be cheaply and easily consolidated under a single brand due to huge 
variations in cultures, management styles and systems.’  
All respondents screened targets against a checklist of ‘must-have’ characteristics prior to 
commencing in-depth due diligence. Table 2.2 summarises the investment criteria common 
to all twelve generalist respondents. 
 
Table 2.2 Investment criteria identified by all respondents.  
A minimum market value circa $5 million (based on a 3 to 5 multiple of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA).  
Strong industry fundamentals (dominant or good market position within its 
industry). 
Ability to grow investment (via revenue, margin enhancement or cost out). 
Compelling exit appeal – ability to IPO or synergic trade sale. 
Proven calibre visionary management team with ‘skin in the game’ to align 
interests with PE investor. 
Strong, sustainable cash flows. 
Potential to apply build and buy strategy (Growth by acquiring competitors) 
Equity available at reasonable multiple of EBITDA (3 to 5 times). 
Low-geared existing capital structure (potential to be leveraged by debt).  
The ability to exert influence on the acquisition’s operations and strategic 
direction, even if such control was legally exercised from a minority holding. (e.g., 
only a 30% holding, but an agreement that the PE firm could appoint a controlling 
vote director onto the acquisition’s Board).  
The twelve generalist respondents emphasised that they applied the same standard 




specialised in acquiring and restructuring/rebuilding distressed companies sourced them 
from administrators or receivers. They were acquired at a low expense/value ratio, and met 
an investment criteria that required the target’s net tangible asset backing to exceed the 
acquisition price.  
 
2.4.4 Percentage equity sought 
Only two of the respondents sought 100% equity. Sixty percent (nine respondents) were 
prepared to accept a minimum 50/50 joint venture, although they preferred a majority 
shareholding. However, the two youngest PE firms were prepared to fund as low as 20% 
equity, providing the acquisition agreement allowed them to exercise ultimate control 
through a structure of voting and non-voting shares. 
The respondent who managed the largest number of unit trusts stated, ‘We deliberately 
seek a minority position provided we have the formal ability to influence key strategic 
decisions and exercise some operational control.’ 
 
2.4.5 How investments are sourced 
SSPE firms stressed that they had to proactively search for investment-grade opportunities. 
All cited lack of investment grade opportunities as the major retardant to the growth of 
SSPE. A typical respondent summed it up: ‘We only do three deals a year – we find some 
ourselves-others come to us – but let me tell you it (sic – finding investment grade 
investments) is like finding a needle in a haystack.’ 
  
Confidentiality was an issue with four of the respondents, who were reluctant to detail their 
investment sourcing modus operandi. Several of the respondents were aware of the 
literatures claim of six to ten-thousand HGFs in Australia. They questioned the validity of the 
data, as the theoretical munificence of HGFs was not supported by their field experience. 
For example, one respondent had only found a single complying investment in the previous 





Another respondent for a listed firm that had attempted to target HGFs commented, ‘Sure, 
on paper there are supposed to be ten-thousand or more high-growth SMEs out there and 
that was the big attraction to us. However, tracking down high-growth SMES that meet our 
investment criteria proved extremely difficult. Members of our network may recommend 
firms, but few of their recommendations survive our preliminary due diligence. For example, 
most of them have management that lacks the ability to carry them to the next level. That 
means that if we proceed, we become a recruiting firm.’ 
 
The respondent for a long-established PE firm also criticised what he saw as the 
misalignment between the optimistic claims of the journal articles and the reality of 
identifying investment grade HGFs in the field: ‘Academia makes no distinction between 
journal articles and commercial reality.’  
 
The second re-occurring issue was the high-value owners of rapidly growing, but relatively 
unprofitable and cash-strapped, firms put on their equity. A respondent commented, ‘When 
they (the target’s owners) learn that we are from private equity, they start mouthing 
stratospheric EBITDA multiples. They value their operations at up to ten times EBITDA.’ 
Six respondents claimed that exploiting smaller HGF’s latent growth potential was often 
hampered by lack of profits in absolute terms. A small HGF’s EBITDA may not be sufficient to 
fund an effective replacement team if the incumbent management team lacked the vision 
and competence needed to take the firm to the next level. The respondent for the largest 
PE firm interviewed for this study stated, ‘We see SMEs as a much higher due diligence risk 
due to their relatively uneducated managers. Economies of scale mean that their EBITDA 
will not support a package to attract the calibre of manager we require.’ 
Several respondents saw $300-400,000 remuneration packages as essential to attract and 
retain visionary strategic managers. The need to initially subsidise high calibre management 
salaries meant that larger acquisitions, with earnings sufficient to cover the remuneration of 
exemplary executive talent, were more attractive. 
The respondents sourced acquisitions from: 




2. Networking industry and executive trade associations. 
3. Financial intermediaries, such as networked accountants, bank managers and 
finance brokers. The latter often charged commissions for successful introductions. 
4. The respondents HNW investors who bought their own deals to the table.  
5. The insolvency profession. 
6.  Focused internet searches for award-winning or fastest growing SMEs and 
franchises. 
2.5 Demand side results 
To gain insight to the demand for SSPE data from a questionnaire sent to SME members of 
the NSW Chamber of Commerce is analysed. Key results are presented in the figures and 
tables below. 
Almost 20% (19.91% or 217 firms) of the total respondents indicated that they would be 
prepared to consider equity funding (See Figure 2.3). The responding SMEs consisted of 
HGFs (5.69%) and other SMEs (94.3%). This is representative of the breakdown in the 
population. The surprising result is that 18% of the other SMEs are seeking equity capital. A 
closer reading of Figure 2.3 shows that 53.8% (1.99/3.70) of HGFs sought equity funding 
rather than bank debt, thus supporting hypothesis 1.   
 
2.5.1 SMEs/HGFs seeking funding 
                                                                                              
              100% of respondent population 
















1.99% 3.70% 18.00% 76.30% 
 
Figure 2.3 Proportion of combined SME/HGF population seeking equity funding.  
The size of the two-hundred seventeen firms seeking equity by employee numbers are 
shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Percentage of SMEs seeking equity by employee numbers.  
 
Based on their forecast revenue growth projections, 5.3% (or fifty-eight of the total one-
thousand ninety-two respondents) were categorised as HGFs, a proportion close to the 6% 
HGF segment identified in offshore studies of entire SME populations (Anyadike-Danes et al. 
2009; Henrekson & Johansson 2010; Stangler 2010; Lopez-Garcia & Puente 2012; Mason & 
Brown 2013; Coad et al. 2014; Lee 2014). Of the fifty-eight firms classified as HGFs, apart 
from projecting substantially increased revenue, all of them expected to employ additional 
staff. As depicted in Figure 2.3, 35% of these HGFs sought equity funding. Pecking order 
theory (Myers & Majluf 1984) predicted that SME owners seeking external funding prefer 
debt over more expensive equity. However, Forsaith and McMahon (2002) found that high-
tech start-ups, HGFs, and nascent HGFs regard equity funding with more equanimity. A 
more recent study by Brettel et al. (2009) confirms that HGFs have a more positive attitude 















‘perceived’ increase in the value of the firm which outweights the nefgatives, including loss 
of control.  
 
2.5.2 Reasons for seeking funding 
Figure 2.5 shows that respondents’ reasons seeking an equity partner differed from the 
pecking order theory’s dominant reason, i.e., difficulty in accessing bank debt. Of the two-
hundred SME respondents prepared to embrace equity funding, only 14% or 6.17% 
expressed difficulty obtaining a bank loan. Although not illustrated separately in Figure 2.5, 
only two of the twenty HGFs seeking equity were refused bank loans. This is contrary to the 
expectations based on pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984), which predicts that 
owners seeking external funding prefer debt over more expensive equity. This supports 
hypothesis 2 and is consistent with Forsaith and McMahon (2002) and Brettel et al. (2009), 
demonstrating that small firms are different from large publicly-listed firms. Rather, a 
dominant motivation of respondents (78.34% of SME respondents: 52.9% of HGF 
respondents) for seeking equity funding was to tap the business knowledge of an 
experienced investor/partner to assist in growing the firm. Equity-seeking SMEs (40.1%) and 
HGFs (46.4%) were also motivated by Reason ‘C,’ the prospect of ongoing funding as the 













Reason                           Reasons that HGFs seek equity funding       
A An experienced investor/partner could bring valuable new skills to assist the business to grow. 
B The right equity partner could continue to fund the business as it grows. 
 
  
C It doesn't matter where the funding comes from, my business is a winner. 
 
  
D My business has difficulty obtaining a bank loan. 
   
  
E We are confident that the business will eventually be listed on the stock exchange.   
 
Figure 2.5 Reasons that SME/HGFs seek equity funding.  
 
2.5.3 Percentage equity offered 
The percentage equity share offered by the equity-seeking respondents varied from 10% to 
50%. Figure 2.6 shows that the five to twenty employee class of SME were prepared to 
sacrifice 30% of their equity for SSPE funding. Only a single sole operator offered an 
absolute controlling interest. The modal class of equity offered for each size of SME (where 
size is based on the number of employees) is shown in Figure 2.6. Although not illustrated in 
Figure 2.6, proportionately the HGF figures were similar. 
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2.6 Explaining the absence of SSPE from SME funding 
We found that three tiers of information asymmetry inhibit the launch of a formal SSPE 
industry. Firstly, potential providers are invisible to HGFs. Secondly, HGFs, even those with a 
compelling investment case, are invisible to PE firms. Thirdly, the literature confirmed 
financial opaqueness of small firms makes them unattractive to professional equity 
investors.  
 
The dominant operational explanation for the absence of SSPE from SME funding paradigms 
is a lack of supply. We found that while the PE firms were unanimous that SSPE funding was 
available for ‘compelling’ investments able to pass the industries’ formidable screening 
criteria, the taxonomy of the descriptor ‘compelling’ appeared to be more qualitative than 
quantitative. Witness the PE firms’ wide-spread employment of the term ‘visionary 
management.’ The specific organisational core competencies that may constitute ‘visionary 
management’ are unresearched. 
 
In light of PE firm’s perceptions that there is a scarcity of compelling SME investments, how 
can small firms signal their quality to them? This is especially difficult when the relevant PE 
firms are camouflaged by ‘the size and fragmentation of capital markets’ (Simeonov 2015). 
The literature is mute on this issue, but our experience suggests that the most obvious 
answer is by emulating larger firms and employing professional capital raising 
intermediaries familiar with capital markets, but that involves agency (brokerage) costs. 
Equity agency or frictional costs are themselves a further causative factor contributing to 
the scarcity of SSPE. Mainstream PE funds are biased to large-scale positions, partly because 
agency and out-of-pocket costs per transaction are low when calculated as a percentage of 
the total investment (Engel & Stiebale 2014). Large targets generally have a history of 
external auditing, which effectively reduces the cost of financial due diligence.  
The costly ASIC licensed intermediary structure is also a deterrent to SSPE growth. The 2016 
Australian Government budget flagged a form of limited partnership (CIV) likely be 
introduced for the income years starting on or after 1 July 2018 (Industry 2016). The 
proposed new CIVs will be required to meet similar audit criteria to the current managed 




debt. Investors in the new CIVs will generally be taxed as if they had invested directly. It is 
possible that introduction of CIVs will facilitate SSPE, but not enough is yet known to make 
this statement with any certainty. 
2.7 Conclusions     
SSPE is a multi-faceted capital funding model which in practice is seriously restricted by 
information asymmetry. The actors are all but invisible to each other. Hypothesis 1 was 
confirmed. This study found no significant supply of SSPE. PE firms target ‘compelling’ 
acquisitions managed by a visionary team, preferably with ‘skin in the game,’ who possess 
outstanding organisational core competencies that enable them to act unilaterally. Given 
high-performance management already in place, the PE firms limit their operational 
involvement in portfolio companies to generalised top-down strategic advice. Generic SMEs 
were a non sequitur, as only larger, proven HGFs had the potential to meet PE firms' 
investment criteria. From a PE firm’s perspective, an HGF acquisition’s growth would 
depend on its in situ proven visionary management team, or as last resort a recruited high 
performance management team. The latter strategy necessitates the targeted investment 
generate sufficient EBITDA to cover the salaries of the recruited high-performance 
executives.  
 
Hypothesis 2 was confirmed, albeit with conditions. We found that the demand by SME’s for 
equity funding was far greater than pecking order theory led us to expect, especially as the 
demand emanated from SME’s that qualified for bank funding. We found that the greater-
than-expected HGFs’ demand for equity capital was predicated on both the utility of 
strategic management guidance from the PE investor and the prospect of ongoing funding. 
We did not explore the dilution effects of ongoing equity funding or a capital structure 
involving PE firm backed senior debt.  
 
We found that the PE respondents were unanimous that SSPE funding is always available for 
‘compelling’ investments able to pass the industries’ formidable screening criteria. The 
taxonomy of the descriptor ‘compelling’ is profit-based, but the descriptor ‘visionary 
management’ is as much qualitative as quantitative. The organisational core competencies 




Equity agency and frictional costs are another causative factor contributing to the scarcity of 
SSPE. The PE firm respondents unanimously agreed that they applied the same intensive 
due diligence procedures, operational and financial, to all acquisitions regardless of size. 
Therefore, as contended by Briozzo and Vigier (2009), SSPE transactional costs were likely to 
be high for the sub $1 million funding. Mainstream PE funds are biased to large-scale 
positions, partly because agency and out-of-pocket costs per transaction are low when 
calculated as a percentage of the total investment (Engel & Stiebale 2014). Large targets 
usually have a history of mandatory external auditing, which further reduces the cost of 
financial due diligence. SSPE would be more attractive to investors if government policy 
enforced auditable financial controls on SMEs, especially now that simple cloud-based 
accounting systems can be accessed and audited by government departments, including the 
Australian Taxation Office.  
Lastly, PE firm respondents held that larger acquisitions exhibited less information 
asymmetry, not only because most of them were legally subject to external audit. As a 
genre, they incorporated more sophisticated internal reporting and financial controls than 
their smaller competitors.  
 
In summary, we found that three tiers of information asymmetry inhibit the launch of a 
formal SSPE industry. We explained the gap between demand and supply for equity funding, 
but offered a richer more detailed rationale than the antecedent reasons evinced in the 
literature. In particular, this study’s data suggests that pecking order theory may no longer 





Chapter 3: Small public listings     
3.1 Introduction 
 
Lack of access to finance presents a major retardant to the growth of the SME sector in 
Australia. Demand and supply of finance to the sector is influenced by factors that do not 
apply to large firms. SMEs have a pecking order of preference for finance; they prefer 
internal equity to debt and debt to external equity. Nonetheless, a significant number of 
medium and growth businesses seek external equity to fund their growth trajectory. The 
National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX) is Australia’s sole small-firm orientated source 
of public listings. 
  
The results indicate an involuntary information asymmetry exists between the NSX and 
SME owners and their advisors. Employing a qualitative grounded theory methodology, 
in-depth interviews were conducted with six owners and thirteen accounting and legal 
advisors. The study found that the NSX’s invisible profile results primarily from an 
endemic failure to raise equity capital for its participants. Operationally, this failure 
stems from lack of underwriting, thin trading, inefficient and expensive trading 
processes, and remote locations. Currently, the NSX it is unable to attract enough listings 
to generate the income required to fund a more effective operation. Serious efforts to 
mitigate the debilitating information asymmetry between SME owners and the NSX are 
needed to increase the utilisation of this little-known bourse. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical background   
Access to external finance is an essential input of sustainable business growth. According to 
pecking order theory, an innate need to maintain control means that few SME owners 
include external equity funding as part of their capital structure (Myers 1984). Nonetheless, 
medium-sized and high-growth entrepreneurial firms that pursue high growth have limited 




sources. Potentially, high-growth firms may also seek external equity at the start-up phase 
from business angels and venture capitalists (Berger & Udell 1998). 
 
Contrary to the generalist findings of a wide body of literature (Paulet et al. 2014), the 
existence of a credit gap for SMEs in Australia continues to be denied by major banks (RBA 
2010). However, there is an undeniable gap in the supply of external equity to finance 
business growth (Scarborough 2012). Private equity providers follow rigorous screening 
processes, are very selective, and provide funding to less than 1% of applicants 
(Scarborough 2012). By global standards, the private equity market in Australia is small. 
Data from the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Ltd. shows that over 
the ten year period to 2012, the Australian Venture Capital Industry raised over $A2billion in 
funds and invested about $A1.5billion in 250 companies (Industry 2016). The Australian 
equity capital raisings compare with over $US27 billion of equity capital invested in 3826 
companies in 2012 in the US (PWC 2013). As a result of the lack of domestic equity funding, 
a significant number of high-growth Australian companies have moved overseas (Industry 
2013).  
 
Private equity providers require a mechanism to liquidate their investments, and initial 
public offerings (IPOs) provide an effective strategy to do so. Without such an outlet, the 
venture capital industry cannot operate effectively. High-growth firms can also access public 
equity directly via IPOs if they are able to meet listing requirements. The benefits of an IPO 
extend beyond access to capital. An IPO minimises the firm’s cost of capital and maximises 
its value (Brau & Fawcett 2006); improves borrowing capacity (Pagano et al. 1998); creates 
publicity for the issuing firm (Demers & Lewellen 2006); and enhances its reputation with 
customers, suppliers, and other influential third parties (Witzel 2005). An IPO is a powerful 
tool for accessing and retaining key employees (Broude 1997). Lastly, IPOs provide a first-
mover advantage to businesses with a winning technology or product, plus sufficient 





3.2.1 Access to public equity on the main and second stock exchanges in 
Australia 
Australia has three stock exchanges: 
 
The mainboard Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) is the entity that operates the 
Australian Stock Exchange (descriptor ‘main stock exchange’) and the Sydney Futures 
Exchange, and facilitates trading in securities and derivatives including shares, futures, 
options and warrants. Market capitalisation (2013) of the Australian Stock Exchange was 
over $1.5 trillion (ASX 2014). 
 
The second board (or junior exchange) is the National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX) 
Unlike the ASX, the NSX is set up and managed specifically to cater for the listing of small 
to medium companies, hence its globally accepted descriptor as a ‘secondary exchange.’ 
The NSX itself is listed on the ASX. The 2012 market capitalisation of the NSX was about 
$3.5 billion (NSX 2012).  
 
The third licensed exchange is Chi-X Australia. The Chi-X is a trading exchange only and is 
not licensed to raise capital by conducting IPOs.  
 
Mainboard stock exchanges, such as the ASX, are not designed to accommodate the small-
scale offerings of SMEs (Berger et al. 2001; Gregory et al. 2005). Most developed Western 
economies offer an effective secondary stock exchange able to provide SMEs with lower 
cost and less onerous listing requirements. To be listed on the ASX, a firm must have $10 
million in total assets or $2 million in net tangible assets; at least 400 shareholders, each 
with a minimum investment of $2,000 with 25% of shares held by unrelated parties; or a 
minimum of 400 investors each with at least $2,000 in shares (ASX 2014). Candidates must 
also meet the profit test, which requires that there are going concerns with $1 million 
cumulative profits over the three years prior to listing and a minimum profit of $400,000 in 
the immediate 12 months to listing (ASX 2014). Listing requires the services of underwriters, 




them, such as underwriters, base their fees on the amount of capital raised. Fees associated 
with listing on the ASX, together with the initial cost charged by the stock exchange, can 
push the cost of a typical listing to more than $1 million.  
 
By comparison to the ASX, the listing criteria and fees for an IPO on the NSX are modest 
(NSX 2009). The NSX requires an applicant to have at least fifty investors, each with a 
minimum $2,000 in shares with 25% of said shares held by unrelated parties. An applicant 
must also have a minimum market capitalisation of $500,000. The NSX does not require a 
minimum profit amount in the immediate past years, but must be able to demonstrate a 
somewhat subjective ‘two years’ adequate track record of performance’ (NSX 2009). 
Alternatively, the firm can have the issue underwritten by an approved underwriter. 
Compared with the ASX, the listing requirements for the NSX are within the reach of many 
medium-sized Australian firms. Nonetheless, very few issue an IPO on the NSX.  
 
The NSX’s ineffective performance, in comparison with its counterparts in the UK, the US, 
and Canada, has serious implications for Australian economic growth. For the financial years 
ended December 2011 and 2012, the NSX raised $A626 million and $A359 million 
respectively (NSX 2014). This compares with $A6.88 billion and $A6.1billion raised for the 
same periods (LSE 2014) by the UK’s secondary exchange, the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM).  
 
Despite the large body of literature devoted to IPOs, there are not many studies focused on 
the performance of secondary exchanges (Rosseau 2007). No study has yet examined the 
NSX’s effectiveness in facilitating SME access to public equity. Nor have researchers 
assessed the attitude of Australian accountants and lawyers to secondary exchange IPOs. 
This paper seeks to fill this gap. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3.3 Research design  
A qualitative interpretive research paradigm employing grounded theory was deemed 
appropriate. The participants in each group were interviewed successively. Each interview 




Cross University. Participants were informed of their rights with respect to the interviews, 
which were recorded and transcribed with their permission. 
 
Effective use of grounded theory requires asking good questions and making comparisons 
from extensive coding and analysis of the interview data (Strauss & Corbin 1998). A semi-
structured questionnaire was used and respondents were encouraged to speak openly on 
the issues contained in the questionnaire. The questionnaire emanated from an extensive 
literature review and the experience of the researcher as a fund manager and business 
broker. It was also reviewed prior to implementation by two appropriately qualified 
research supervisors.  
 
Open coding as recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998) was employed as the primary 
data analysis methodology. Each line, sentence, and paragraph of the transcribed data was 
analysed and categorised for common as well as unique responses to the questions. 
Following Dick’s (2000) suggestion, sequential phases of data-collection, note-taking, 
coding, and memoing were completed individually for each interview, prior to conducting 
the subsequent interview. Successive interviews were continued until they yielded no 
further significant information, that is, until ‘saturation point’ was reached (Schutt 2004). 
Interviews and analyses were conducted firstly with the owners, followed by their lawyers 
and accountants, and finally with unrelated independent accountants and lawyers.  
 
3.4 Sample 
A list of medium-sized businesses, with market values between $A1 – 2 million, sold within 
the last ten years, was requested from each of six brokers known to the author. The 
respondent businesses were selected randomly from each of the lists. Owners of five 
businesses nominated their accountants, who also agreed to participate in the study. In 
addition, three of the owners nominated their lawyers as useful informants. Four other 
accountants were randomly selected from a list of accountants with medium-sized clients 
with whom the author has dealings in the course of his business. The final two respondents 
were a high-profile independent legal representative who claimed to be well-versed in 





The findings are sequenced by participant type, starting with the owners as the primary 
respondents, followed by their nominated accountants, independent accountants, and 
finally the lawyers. The findings at point of saturation are presented for each participant 
group. 
 
3.5.1 SME owners 
Only one of the SME owners had a university degree, an MBA. Four were actively seeking to 
exit their businesses which they had owned and operated for at least twenty years. Their 
businesses generated EBITDAs from $300,000 to over $1 million, thus they fell within the 
primary criteria for exiting via an NSX IPO. The remaining two respondents were seeking 
between $3 million and $5 million to fund major acquisitions. Both groups of participants 
had considered an equity partner in the form of a sophisticated investor, but never 
considered an IPO on the NSX. Saturation point was reached by the fourth interview on the 
following issues: 
1. None of the respondents were aware of the role of the NSX. Banks were seen as the 
monopoly source of business capital apart from loans from family or acquaintances. 
2. With one exception, none knew what an IPO meant or entailed. The exception held 
an MBA, was aware in broad terms of the advantages of an IPO, but was totally 
unaware of the existence of the NSX. 
3. None had a formal exit plan. They believed that the only exit pathway available to 
them was to sell the business on the open market or through a trade sale.  
4. Lawyers were not seen as a source of strategic financial advice. 
5. All respondent’s relied heavily on financial advice from their accountants, including 
all aspects of raising capital. 
 
3.5.2 Nominated external accountants 
All respondent accountants had tertiary qualifications and held public practicing certificates 
as Chartered Accountants, Certified Practising Accountants, or Public Accountants. They 




that they closely followed their accountant’s advice, using euphemisms such as ‘why have a 
dog and bark yourself’ to justify their unquestioning faith in their accountants. Saturation 
point was quickly reached by the third interview with the nominated accountants. It became 
clear that the majority knew very little about raising public equity, especially the mechanics 
of an IPO, and knew nothing about the NSX. The findings at the saturation point were as 
follows:  
1. They were not aware of the acronym NSX or what it stood for. 
2. They did not understand the potential role of the NSX in exiting or raising capital for 
SMEs. 
3. While most were broadly aware of what an IPO on the ASX meant, none had a basic 
understanding of the procedures or protocols for listing on an exchange. 
4. They believed that an IPO would be prohibitively expensive, as would the ongoing 
costs of maintaining a listing. Estimates ranged from hundreds of thousands to 
millions of dollars. 
 
 
3.5.3 Other accountants in public practice specialising in SMEs 
Of the four independent accountants in public practice who held themselves out as business 
advisors, only one was aware of the NSX and the basic steps involved in an IPO. The other 
three accountants lacked knowledge of small-cap IPOs and had not heard of the NSX. The 
accountant with some knowledge of the NSX stated that he would never recommend an IPO 
to a client, as it cost hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars to list. He confused the 
cost of an IPO on the NSX with that on the ASX. He also saw the requirement of an annual 
audit for listed companies as a major obstacle for two reasons: finding a registered auditor 
and the cost of an audit. In spite of leading questions, the specific steps to an NSX IPO, 
including developing a prospectus, meeting compliance requirements, controlling equity 
dilution, and underwriting, were totally unknown to this participant. The lack of IPO 
knowledge displayed by the four accountants who were independent of the owners, 





1. With one exception, none knew what the acronym NSX stood for. This respondent 
believed that it meant Newcastle Stock Exchange, unaware that the exchange had 
been renamed the National Stock Exchange in December 2006. 
 
2. They did not understand, even conceptually, how the NSX could play a role in any 
effective exit or capital-raising strategy for SMEs. The concept of a relatively low-cost 
listing on the NSX appeared to be little more than a theoretical abstraction, remote 
from their day-to-day preoccupation with tax accounting for their SME clients. 
 
3. All were aware of what an IPO on the ASX meant in the broadest sense, but no one 
was aware of the most basic procedures or protocols required for an IPO. 
 
4. All were strongly convinced that an IPO would be far too expensive for an SME. They 




None of the owners advocated their lawyers as a reliable source of financial advice. Two 
described their lawyers’ knowledge of finance in depreciating terms. In spite of this, three 
nominated lawyers were interviewed. Two represented major law firms specialising in 
raising equity for listed and non-listed companies and the other was a suburban lawyer who 
described himself as a business specialist. While they understood the meaning of the 
acronym IPO and were aware of the role of the NSX, they had no experience or 
understanding of the structure or execution of an IPO on the NSX. They stated that they had 
never even considered a second-tier IPO as a solution to any of their clients’ capital needs. 
None of them could recall any formal, graduate or undergraduate training in the legal or 
financial structures of IPOs.  
 
A high-profile public equity specialist lawyer was interviewed for his views regarding the 
NSX. He knew of the NSX, but held quite strong views on its ability to facilitate access to 




second stock exchange, the lawyer was adamant that he would not recommend the NSX to 
his SME clients, citing the following reasons: 
 
1. The NSX was unable to attract underwriters for prospective issuers. 
 
2. Chronically thin trading made the NSX unattractive to institutional and sophisticated 
investors. 
 
3. The NSX was not connected to the Bloomberg System.  
 
4. Incompetent administration of the NSX had resulted in a series of well-publicised 
financial losses. The substantial losses marred the image of the NSX when compared 
to the strictly governed and highly profitable ASX. 
  
5. More effective offshore secondary exchanges existed. The lawyer was especially 
supportive of the Toronto Stock Exchange Venture Exchange (TSXVE), claiming it had 
access to deeper pools of investment capital, yet it charged less to issue an IPO than 
the NSX. His firm had recently facilitated a successful Australian listing on the TSXVE. 
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Significant information asymmetry exists between the NSX and its potential SME listing  
participants. The study revealed that the NSX’s primary function as an equity capital-raising 
bourse was unknown to its SME target market or the market’s advisers. The void existed 
despite a wide body of literature, both academic and professional, promoting IPOs as an 
effective source of capital for high-growth SMEs. As a consequence of this involuntary 
information asymmetry, SME owners and trusted advisors, including lawyers, accountants 
and business consultants, did not even consider an IPO as an exit pathway or source of 
growth capital.  
 
Smaller accounting firms’ failure to recognise and understand the role of secondary 




confirmed the reliance of SME owners place on their accountants for advice on raising 
capital or exiting their businesses. In accordance with earlier studies (Mole 2002; Hayes 
2003; Schutt 2004; Hartcher 2005; Ford 2009), we found that when Australian SME owners 
used a single source of external advice, it was invariably their accountant rather than their 
bank manager or lawyer.  
 
A conundrum was evident. If accountants played such a key role in devising financial 
strategies for their SME clients, why did they know so little about IPOs or the NSX? The short 
answer came from one of the respondent accountants: ‘If IPOs on the NSX were so 
effective, we would all know about it and be advising our clients accordingly.’  
 
The study’s result also suggested that IPOs were absent from the curriculum of tertiary 
programs in accounting. The sole new accounting graduate interviewed had never heard of 
Australia’s only second exchange and did not know what the acronym IPO meant. It could 
be argued that this was an isolated case, but the data collected from the qualified 
accountant respondents showed that they had little or no knowledge of the structure or 
benefits of IPOs. The results also suggested that the benefits and processes involved in 
executing a secondary exchange IPO are not covered in the post graduate professional 
programs of accounting institutes.  
 
Despite the lack of IPO acumen in the lower tiers of their profession, professional 
accounting bodies have occasionally published articles aimed at educating their accredited 
members on the complexities of taking large companies, as distinct from SMEs, to IPO. For 
example, Wilkinson and Buchanan (2010) authored a comprehensive paper on IPOs for the 
Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants. The paper did not mention the NSX, focusing 
only on the ASX. Their target audience was delineated by their introductory comment 
(Wilkinson & Buchanan 2010) ‘Companies need to have a market capitalisation of at least 
$100 million before considering listing publicly.’ No similar papers have ever been published 
by accounting institutes aimed at enticing SMEs to list on the NSX.  
 
The NSX’s inability to promote itself to small accounting practices, many acting as trusted 




The NSX executive blamed a lack of funds as the prime barrier to launching an effective 
promotional campaign aimed at smaller accounting practices. 
 
SME owner/respondents disavowed lawyers as having expertise raising capital expertise. 
This finding is contrary to Robson and Bennett’s (2000) UK finding that lawyers are among 
the most effective external sources of advice on financing. It is also contrary to Mole’s 
(2002) research involving UK SMEs, where lawyers ranked second only to accountants as 
trusted business advisors.  
 
Most of the respondent business lawyers understood the concept of an IPO in general 
terms, stemming from their own investment activities on the ASX. With the single 
exception, none of them showed a comprehension of the role or protocols of secondary 
exchanges. None of them could recall any formal, graduate, or undergraduate training on 
the legal or financial structures of IPOs. However, unlike the accountant respondents, the 
lawyer respondents showed interest in learning more about IPOs on the NSX. They 
conjectured that expertise in small-cap IPOs could be a profitable addition to their practice.  
 
The exception referred to above was a highly-experienced capital-raising lawyer who 
understood the role of the NSX, but doubted its effectiveness as an exchange. He cited 
serious flaws in the NSX’s ability to competitively service both its listed companies and their 
investors. His attitude mirrored research findings (Di Stefano 2004) that a lack of willing 
underwriters was a major barrier to small-cap IPOs on emerging exchanges. Many 
underwriters avoid small-cap IPOs because they do not generate sufficient underwriting 
fees to cover the cost of auditing etc. (Osterle 2006). The dearth of institutional 
underwriting support for NSX IPOs is reflected in its Listing Rule No 3.6 (NSX 2009), which 
allows issuers to self-underwrite, although few appear to have the financial resources or 
expertise to do so. 
 
The capital-raising lawyer respondent saw extremely thin trading as the second significant 
causal factor of the dearth of listings on the NSX. Thin trading is characteristic of the small-
cap shares; they are less liquid, and trade in small volumes and less frequently (Antoniou et 




when compared the average daily trades on the NSX with the London Stock Exchange’s AIM 
and TSXVE. The average number of daily trades on the AIM in 2009 was 19,150 (Staple 
2009) and 17,990 for the TSXVE (Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada 
2009). This compares with 495 trades on the NSX for the entire 2009 calendar year (NSX 
2014). Poor liquidity adds to the cost of buying and selling the shares and to market 
volatility, due to buying and selling pressures on small and infrequent transactions 
(Antoniou et al. 2002).  
 
The lawyer respondent’s third criticism concerned the absence of a link to the Bloomberg 
System and to an electronic trading system. This discourages small volumes of trade while 
the mandatory use of brokers significantly increases the cost of trading to investors. The 
study found that NSX investors were seriously disadvantaged by broker induced delays on 
price movements, when compared to the ASX’s almost instantaneous electronic system. 
Modernising secondary and emerging exchanges by using an electronic trading system and 
trading online enhance their attractiveness to both issuers and investors (Lauterbach 2001).  
 
Overall, our findings revealed a financial tautology. Lack of patronage of the NSX is 
attributable to its invisibility, poor liquidity, and thin trading, abetted by an antiquated and 
costly transaction system. Yet the NSX cannot upgrade its systems and processes and 
effectively promote its operations until it reverses its own negative cash flow. We 
conjecture that a take-over of the NSX by a Tier 1 private equity firm or the ASX may be the 
only strategy to achieve viable secondary stock exchange in Australia. Both the AIM and the 
TSXVE are closely linked to their respective main stock exchanges. They trade on the same 
floor and use the same electronic trading system as their mainstream partners.  
 
Tertiary institutions and professional institutions could also assist by including the financial 
and administrative structure of secondary exchange IPOs in their curricula. From a macro-
economic viewpoint, an enhanced awareness by SME owners and their advisors of the 
benefits of public equity funding would contribute to a more efficient Australian secondary 
exchange and drive employment. The escalating volume of trades on the low-cost TSXVE 




growth strongly support this contention (Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of 




Chapter 4: Reducing information asymmetry: The performance 
determinants of small-cap SEOs     
4.1 Abstract 
We investigate the statistical and economic effect of fifty-four organisational core 
competencies on post-seasoned equity offerings (SEO) abnormal returns (ARs) for 
S&P/Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Emerging Companies Index (XEC) firms having 
SEOs between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2014. We employed stepwise discriminant analysis 
(rather than logistic regression as the sample size was small) which demonstrate significant 
positive relationships to CEO’s tertiary education, EPS, technology transfer and the adoption 
of disruptive technology. We develop a long term AR predictive equation which classified 
high-quality (e.g., cherries) and low-quality (lemons) firms with a 95.3% accuracy. If 
investors adopt a trading strategy of buying the cherries and shorting the lemons, this would 
achieve superior ARs (as high as 300%) three years post-SEO. 
4.2 Introduction 
Mistrust emanating from asymmetric information, and associated agency problems, drives a 
wedge between investors and listed firms seeking additional equity funding (Li & Zaiats 
2017). Information asymmetry makes investors less able to distinguish between high and 
low-quality firms. This is problematic for firms, as they are forced to issue pricing discounts 
to attract investors, a strategy that increases their cost of capital.  
The adverse effects of information asymmetry are particularly pronounced in SEOs (Teoh et 
al. 1998; He et al. 2010; Comiran et al. 2016). SEOs are regulated capital-raising 
mechanisms, primarily driven by the issuer’s short-term liquidity needs (DeAngelo et al. 
2007a; Wen-Ben et al. 2013). DeAngelo et al. (2007) emphasise a ‘survival’ motivation, 
claiming that ‘firms conduct SEOs to resolve a near-term liquidity squeeze, not to primarily 
exploit market timing opportunities.’  
Prior studies on mitigating information asymmetry have focused on enforced disclosure 
requirements (Russell 2015) or enhanced governance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Jackson et al. 




2017). However, there appears to be little relationship between these factors and a firm’s 
financial performance (Wahba 2013).  
In small-cap SEOs, the issue price discount usually correlates with the perceived amount of 
information asymmetry (Brous et al. 2001). However, according to Carpentier et al. (2012), 
investors are more concerned with the validity of ex-post-SEO financial performance 
projections than the size of the issue discount. Clearly, there is a need for a discriminatory 
mechanism to dissolve the shroud of information asymmetry from performance projections. 
This study builds on McDermott (2003) and other researchers’ work by testing 
organisational core competencies as predictors of the financial performance of smaller 
listed firms. We test fifty-three proxies for five organisational core competencies against 
empirically measured post-SEO performance. We develop a competency screening 
algorithm to address information asymmetry, and assist investors to determine the 
probability of a firm achieving its projected financial performance. 
Akerlof’s (1970) theory of the impact of information asymmetry on used-car values offers a 
behavioural explanation that can be applied to the pricing of small caps. Akerlof (1970) 
contends that in a market place where the intrinsic differences between ‘cherries’ and 
‘lemons’ are clouded by information asymmetry, there will be a discount on the price of 
high-quality cherries and a premium paid for low-quality lemons. Akerlof (1970) is 
suggesting that information asymmetry conceals both positive and negative information. 
The study extends the scope of post-Akerlof (1970) research, which mostly focuses on 
adverse information concealed or distorted by information asymmetry (Leland & Pyle 1977; 
Reber & Fong 2006; Li & Zhao 2008). We argue that the effect of understated or missing 
positive information is underresearched. We hypothesise that the quantum of concealed 
positive and negative information can be determined by measuring a suite of the firm’s core 
competencies. 
Lahti (1999) defines organisational core competence as ‘essentially a construct based on the 
existence of a concept that is not in itself directly measurable,’ but holds that ‘related’ 




places the evolution of organisational core competencies at the highest level of an 
organisation.  
 
We attempt to measure the impact of most (but not all) core competencies empirically, as 
distinct from the literatures’ plethora of subjective measures (sometimes self-assessed) 
corporate and individual competencies. Wright (2011) observed that ‘subjective measures 
of human capital seem to dominate HRM literature.’ He was referring to the large body of 
literature linking a taxonomy of behavioural traits to corporate performance. Such 
competencies include emotional-IQ (Ellstrand et al. 1999), ethics and governance (Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003; Jackson et al. 2008; Huang & Tompkins 2010), leadership (Mahsud 2006; 
Wood & Vilkinas 2007; Papalexandris & Galanaki 2008), net-working skills (Wincent & 
Westerberg 2005; Yoo & Kwangsoo 2012), cultural empathy (Giberson et al. 2009), and 
corporate social performance (Cochran & Wood 1984).  
 
Most of the cited studies of subjective competencies measure the resulting corporate 
performance in the same qualitative terms. For example, Wood and Vilkinas’s (2007) study 
assumed high levels of CEO performance because ‘all managed highly successful 
organisations,’ but omits to define what makes an organisation ‘successful.’ McDermott’s 
(2003) respondents subjectively self-assess their corporate success. There is little empirical 
evidence linking the cited subjective competencies with absolute financial performance. To 
address these issues in the prior research, the current study uses more objective measures 
to proxy for the core competencies.  
 
4.3 Motivation and theoretical background 
From an investor’s perspective, the ability to validate a firm’s financial projections prior to 
making the investment is a high priority. Building on Akerlof’s (1970) seminal work on 
lemons and cherries, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majiluf (1984) theoretically 
show that information asymmetry distorts investment decisions. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
argue that a firm is more likely to issue equity when it knows that its stock is overvalued. 
McLaughlin et al. (1996) analysed SEOs issued between 1980 and 1991, and found that 




20% median change in cash-flow ratio during the three year period following the SEO.’ We 
suggest that the SEO investors suffered losses because they could not discern the positive or 
negative quantum of the issuer’s organisational competitive advantage at the time they 
made the investment. 
 
There appears to be no prior study directly linking SEO information asymmetry, either 
positively or negatively, with competitive advantage generated by organisational core 
competence. For three decades, the Industrial Organisational (Porter 1985) and the 
Resource-Based View (Barney 1991) models have dominated explanations of competitive 
advantage. The Industrial Organisation (IO) model assumes that because most firms have 
similar strategically relevant resources, competitive advantage can only be gained when a 
firm finds the industry with the highest profit potential. In contrast, the Resource-Based 
View (RBV) model holds that the key factors for success lie within the firm’s internalised 
resources and capabilities. In the RBV model, the firm’s strategies are dictated by how best 
to maximise its internal resources relative to opportunities and threats in the existing 
industry, rather than move to a new or different industry offering enhanced profit potential. 
A recent study (Huang et al. 2015) conceptualised the two approaches in terms of 
temporary and sustainable competitive advantage, suggesting that a move to a more 
profitable market (the IO concept) yields only a temporary competitive advantage. 
According to the RBV model, a firm ‘possessing superior technological resources or abilities 
can obtain a better outcome of sustainable competitive advantage’ (Huang et al. 2015). This 
contention is strongly supported in the literature (Drejer 2000; McDermott 2003; Chen & 
Wu 2007; Hafeez & Essmail 2007; Agha et al. 2012; Edgar & Lockwood 2012), and by the 
publicised performance of large corporations such as GE, Samsung, and Apple. However, 
this has never been adequately tested against smaller firms.  
For small-cap stocks, empirical evidence supporting claimed organisational core 
competencies is often difficult to extract from an SEO issuers’ self-serving prospectus or 
Information Memorandum (IM). Ex-ante predictions may be exaggerated by endogenous 
agency influences characteristic of low levels of organisational core competence 




independent critiques of a firm’s endogenous organisational competencies are virtually non-
existent (Bowen et al. 2008).  
The motivation for this study is twofold: (1) to build on the competency determinant work 
that commenced with Prahalad and Hamel (1990), and continued with researchers such as 
Hafeez and Essmail (2007) and McDermott (2003); and (2) to also use the study’s findings to 
reduce the deleterious effect of information asymmetry that inhibits investment in smaller 
firms.  
4.4 Hypothesis development: The drivers of competitive advantage 
Capital market participants seek reliable financial performance markers to determine the 
veracity of the financial performance projections contained in a firm’s capital-raising 
memorandums or prospectuses. As cited earlier, the literature holds that poorly-managed 
firms (Akerlof’s lemons) tend to use information asymmetry to overvalue equity and mask 
underperformance (Carpentier et al. 2012). It could also be argued that non-disclosure of 
positive information may also mask the determinants of potentially high-performance 
companies (Akerlof’s cherries).  
 
Small-cap stocks traditionally occupy the densest end of the information asymmetry 
continuum (O'Shea et al. 2008). The quantum of asymmetry also correlates with some 
degree of equity owned by board members (agency theory), which is higher in small firms 
(Bowen et al. 2008; Abosede & Oseni 2011; Carpentier et al. 2012; Iddon et al. 2013).  
While earnings management is one possible explanation of post-SEO underperformance, 
the literature advances a number of alternative explanations. Poor performance is 
associated with the lack of marketing acumen (Mizik & Jacobson 2007), poor governance 
(Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Hoje & Yontae 2007), and the ineffective allocation of SEO proceeds 
(Maksimovic & Phillips 2002; Jeanneret 2005; Autore et al. 2009; Bayless & Jay 2013). These 
examples suggest that diminished core organisational competencies are drivers of 
competitive advantage and, ultimately, organisational performance (Agha et al. 2012).  
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) defined a firm’s competence as the bundle of skills, aptitudes, or 




‘unique benefit’ is interchangeable with ‘competitive advantage.’ Hafeez and Essmail (2007) 
interpret Hamel and Prahalad’s (1994) concept of ‘organisational’ core competence as 
representing ‘those specific capabilities that represent the collective learning of the 
organization and provide it with real competitive advantage.’ Hamel and Prahalad’s (1994) 
idea motivated a substantial and ongoing research effort to identify which core 
competencies are the primary drivers of organisational competitive advantage (Drejer 2000; 
McDermott 2003; Chen & Wu 2007; Hafeez & Essmail 2007; Agha et al. 2012; Edgar & 
Lockwood 2012). McDermott (2003) cautions that ‘not all competencies bestow a firm with 
superior advantage,’ adding ‘to be considered core, the competence must meet three 
criteria: customer value, competitive differentiation and extendability.’ McDermott (2003) 
stops short of explicitly measuring her ‘superior advantage’ in terms of financial 
performance, unless profitability is considered a component of ‘extendability.’ 
 
Huang et al. (2015) emphasise that the determinants of ‘superior technological resources or 
capabilities’ are high levels of fundamental core competencies. This study measures the 
effectiveness of five fundamental core competencies (the independent variables depicted in 
Figure 4.1) in terms of absolute financial performance (the dependent variable).  
 
We hold that the stipulated five core competencies are the fundamental endogenous 
drivers of financial performance. The firm’s Board of Directors including the CEO (assuming 
the CEO sits or directly reports to the Board) are the custodians of the firm’s overarching 
suite of organisational core competencies. Although, in a detailed technical sense, some 
input may emanate from a lower management level (Hamel & Prahalad 1994). This concept 





Figure 4.1 Core competencies, competitive advantage and firm performance  
 
The independent variables are shown on the left of Figure 4.1, with the dependent variable 
‘financial performance’ depicted on the right. The depicted independent variables 
contribute to financial performance as follows: 
 
4.4.1 Competency: Resource maximisation 
The limited availability of finance is a well-recognised inhibitor of growth in SMEs (Becchetti 
& Trovato 2002), but the ability to maximise the productivity of financial resources already 
at hand has is a neglected area of research, though it is a marker of entrepreneurial success 
(Dwyer & Kotey 2016). 
 
In the context of this study, resource maximisation competency refers to the ability to utilise 
a given quantum of financial resources to achieve optimal financial performance. For 
example, the allocation of the proceeds of an SEO to a new project is a growth generating 
strategy compared to applying the proceeds to fund existing operational expenses or retire 






4.4.2 Competency: Strong governance 
‘Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’ (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). An 
extensive body of literature (Cochran & Wood 1984; McGuire et al. 1988; Kiel & Nicholson 
2003; Matolcsy et al. 2004; Hoje & Yontae 2007; Liao et al. 2011; Eggers et al. 2013; Huang 
et al. 2015) correlates a firm’s success (mostly measured in non-financial terms) with the 
strength of its corporate governance.  
 
4.4.3 Competency: Explicit industry knowledge 
We define explicit industry knowledge as a firm specific competency that entails the in-
depth knowledge, understanding, and expertise to act as a technical authority within that 
industry.  McClelland (1973); Wang et al. (2004); Chen and Wu (2007); Laguna et al. (2012); 
Huang et al. (2015) all found that industry-specific technical competencies were drivers of 
sustained competitive advantage. Laguna (2012) ranks industry and technical skills (explicit 
industry knowledge) as the critical competencies that have ‘significant and direct effects on 
business growth.’ 
 
Explicit industry knowledge is the dominant component of a firm’s intellectual capital. 
Barney (1991) holds that intellectual capital is the major corporate strategic asset capable of 
generating sustainable competitive advantage and superior financial performance. The 
difference between a firm’s market value and book value may be explained by the perceived 
value of its intellectual capital (Edvinsson & Malone 1997; Ming-Chin et al. 2005). 
 
4.4.4 Competency: Adaptability to change 
Adaptability to change means achieving success by recognising and adapting to the changing 
needs, wants, and aspirations of target markets (Walsh & Lipinski 2009). Eggers et al. (2013) 
contend that a purely responsive and reactive approach to customer needs will not lead to 




(2010) directly links marketing capability with innovative capability, finding that the 
composite adaptive competency is a significant driver in sustaining competitive advantage.  
  
4.4.5 Competency: Innovation 
Lee’s (2010) incremental innovation competency may generate higher levels of financial 
performance, but it is not the same as a disruptive innovation competency; though the 
latter may be complimented by the former (Cowden & Alhorr 2013). Bower and Christensen 
(1995) defined disruptive innovation as ‘an innovation that creates a new market and value 
network that eventually replaces leading firms, products and alliances.’ Christensen (2006) 
contends firms that continue on a progressive trajectory of adaptive innovation run the risk 
of being blind-sided by a disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation has been advanced by 
Christensen (2006) as a game changer in adding market value, even for firms that are early 
adopters rather than creators (Cowden & Alhorr 2013; Notarantonio & Quigly 2013; Jones et 
al. 2016). Disruptive innovations are more likely to emanate from the smaller, more agile 
listed firms analysed in this study rather than their global counterparts.  
 
 
We hypothesise that:  
 
H1: The five core competencies are positively related to ex-post-SEO financial performance. 
 
H2: The five core competencies can be combined to predict post-SEO financial performance 
identifying whether a firm is a cherry or a lemon. 
 
4.5 Research design 
4.5.1 Sample 
The sample was derived from the population of constituent firms on the S&P/ASX XEC as of 
30 June 2017. The index has a maximum quota of two-hundred securities that are selected 




hundred fifty to six-hundred on ASX by capitalisation at the time of their inclusion. The 
average firm in our sample had a market capitalisation of $260 million (see Table 4.1). The 
small-cap market (termed the microcap market by the Australian Securities Exchange) was 
considered highly responsive to H1 and H2, as it suffers from thin trading-induced pricing 
sensitivity (higher beta values) due to asymmetric information (Reinganum & Smith 1983; 
Orycaso & Rogers 2004; O'Shea et al. 2008; Ozenbas et al. 2010). Our sample consists of 
41% resource firms (SIC 01-14; GICS 10,15), 17% manufacturing (SIC 15-29; GICS 15, 20), 3% 
utilities (SIC 49; GICS 50, 55), 5% financial services (SIC 60-69; GICS 40), and 33% ‘other’ 
category which includes wholesale, retail, health care and IT firms. In terms of size, average 







Table 4.1 Overview of S&P/ASX Emerging Company sample firms by SEO year 
 
Between 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2014, there were one-hundred fifty-eight SEOs issued by our 
sample firm. The 30 June 2014 cut-off date provided the study with a minimum of three 
years (t + 3 years) to measure post-SEO issue performance. This allowed access to an annual 
report measuring three years post-SEO (t + 3 years) performance up to the end of the 
Australian financial year 30 June 2017; where a firm had issued more than one SEO during 
the sample period, we chose the most recent SEO which resulted in a sample size of sixty-
three firms. We include all three public offering classes of SEO: Rights Issues, Share Purchase 
Plans, and Dividend Reinvestment Plans. We excluded placements unless they were a hybrid 
instrument wherein investors were also publicly solicited on the open market. The excluded 
private placements involved covertly placing large blocks of shares (usually 5% or more of 
the companies authorised capital) by direct negotiation with institutions or sophisticated 
investors. We agree with the literature’s contention that institutional funds possess greater 
analytical capabilities that may inure them against information asymmetry adversely 
affecting a private placement (Abiden et al. 2012; Wang 2012; Liang & Jang 2017).  
 
4.5.2 Methodology 
We obtained both empirical and descriptive data from the firms’ annual and half-yearly 
reports, official exchange announcements, and a range of business media. Web-enabled 






Assets     
$ Mil 
Revenue   
$ Mil 
Market 
Capitalisation   
$ Mil Resource Manufacturing Utility Finance Other 
2008 2 1 
   
1  482.95   241.55  244.57 
2009 4 2 2 
   
 441.80   451.38  91.64 
2010 5 3 
   
2  15.51   5.91  27.91 
2011 8 3 4 
  
1  230.42   193.20  283.96 
2012 14 6 1 1 1 5  373.87   302.31  587.02 
2013 23 9 4 1 2 7  241.35   153.40  210.47 
2014 7 2 
   
5  188.70   113.12  168.63 
Count 63 26 11 2 3 21       




4.5.3 Dependent variables 
We assume that investment would be made after receiving a prospectus or presentation 
detailing the terms of the SEO. Thus, rather than rely on the SEO announcement or filing 
dates provided by commercial databases, we sifted through each firm’s ASX announcements 
to determine the earliest date that full information about the SEO and its pricing was made 
available to shareholders. The chosen announcements were prefaced with words such as 
Non-Renounceable Rights Issue Prospectus, Retail Entitlement Offer Booklet, Share 
Purchase Plan Offer Documents, Offer Statement, Capital Raising Presentation, or simply 
Prospectus.  
 
The earliest date that full information was available for the SEO is defined as the SEO date 
‘t.’ We measure financial performance for two post-SEO periods: Short Term: one year from 
SEO date (t + 1) and Long Term: three years from SEO date (t + 3) and via two metrics: 
accounting performance and market performance. Accounting performance is defined as 
return on assets (ROA) measured by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortisation (EBITDA)/Total Assets (Clarke et al. 2004; Pojezney 2007). Short-term ROA is 
measured at the end of the fiscal year following the SEO date (t + 1), and long-term ROA is 
measured at the end of three fiscal years following the SEO date (t + 3). 
  
Market performance is defined as ARs benchmarked against the S&P/ASX XEC. The short 
and long-term AR assume a simple ‘buy and hold’ strategy (Sahin 2005).  
 
Due to the issues in estimating the market model for small-cap stocks, we calculate simple 
market adjusted return following Brown and Warner (1980) as follows: 
 
      R(t+x)   = ((P(t + x) – Pt)/Pt ) - ((I(t + x) – It)/It)     [1] 
 
Where R(t + x) = rate of return for period (t + x) 
 P(t + x) = equity price at  period (t + x) adjusted for dividends 
 Po =equity price at the SEO offer date 
 I(t + x) = the XEC value at (t + x) 
 It = the XEC value at the SEO offer date 




 X = the end of a period from the offer date measured in years. 
 
We obtained share prices, adjusting for dividends and splits, and prices for the S&P/ASX ECI 
index (small-cap XEC) from Bloomberg.   
 
4.5.4 Independent variables 
Neither the parameters of asymmetric information nor the dimensions of the nominated 
organisational core competencies are directly observable. Any broad observation-based 
assessment of organisational competencies is likely to be rife with resolute ambiguities that 
can frustrate efforts to identify causal links with financial performance (March & Sutton 
1997). Core competencies can only be measured by proxied correlations with historic 
outcomes (Abosede & Oseni 2011), such as the AR and ROAs adopted by this study. 
We developed a series of fifty-four explanatory proxies spread over five core competency 
groups. We were guided by the prior work of Priem et al. (1999), Reber and Fong (2006), 
and Abosede and Oseni (2011). The robustness criteria advocated by Priem et al. (1999) was 
observed in the selection of all fifty-four proxy constructs. The criteria called for:   
1) Construct validity over measurement reliability. 
2) Explanation rather than prediction. 
3) Prescription over prediction. 
 
Our ability to develop proxies for the five designated core competency groups depicted in 
Figure 4.2 was limited by the probability that some proxies may be both firm and market 
specific (Reber & Fong 2006; Abosede & Oseni 2011). Some proxies may also reflect more 
than one of the designated core competencies while still showing a strong correlation with 
the selected dependent variable.  
 
 




1. The ability to optimise market performance from a given quantum of financial 
resources (Resource Max: RM)   
2. The quality of governance (Strong Governance: SG)  
3.  Industry-specific technological qualifications and experience (Explicit Industry 
Knowledge: EIK)  
4. The ability to detect and quickly adapt to customer changing needs (Adaptability to 
Change: ADP)  
5. The ability to innovate to competitive advantage (Innovation: INN)  
 
We defined, coded, and allocated the fifty-four proxies (cross-reference Table 4.2) across 
the five core competencies as follows:  
 
Resource Maximisation (RM)  
All financial data, unless otherwise stated, are obtained from the latest annual, half-yearly 
or quarterly report issued during the period (t - 1 year). The reports were either accessed 
directly from ASX archives or, where stated, some specific data was obtained from 
Bloomberg and Capital IQ archives. 
1. CCC is the cash conversion cycle (CCC). Bolek (2014) demonstrate that the cash 
conversion cycle is a significant marker of resource maximisation, and is linked to 
working capital and the required rate of return. We measured it as follows: 
     CCC = Days AR + Days Inventory – Days AP 
     Decades earlier, Ou and Penman (1989) used a logistic regression model to  
demonstrate that days in accounts receivable is a direct predictor of common stock 
returns.  
2.  LTE is the ratio of long-term borrowings to market value of equity. Bhandari (1988) 
reports a firm’s debt/ equity ratio was positively related to expected returns on 
common stock (see also proxy DE). The long-term debt to equity ratio is the most 




3. GM is the gross profit margin calculated by deducting the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) 
from total sales revenue. Note that we have a number of resources companies in our 
Index, and this measure does have a positive linear correlation with financial 
performance for the typical US resource firms which tend to be price takers (Cairns 
2001). However, in Australia, with a predominance of resource firms, this is the case. 
Due to vigorous price, competition firms such as Fortescue Metals have gained 
significant market share against larger companies such as Rio and BHP.  This ratio 
measures the competence of the company to generate a mark-up on its product or 
service in the face of competition (Hitchner 2011). 
4. RFA is the ratio of fixed assets to total equity (property, plant and equipment). This 
ratio is a statistically significant predictor of financial performance (Ou & Penman 
1989).  
5. SFA is the ratio of sales revenue to fixed assets. This ratio is one of the six ratios that 
Ou and Penman (1989) hold as statistically significant predictors of stock returns.  
6. STA is the ratio of short-term borrowings to total assets (excluding-intangibles). 
Dananti et al. (2017) showed that this liquidity ratio is a significant predictor of, but 
inversely related to, financial performance. 
7. LTTA is the ratio of long-term borrowings to total assets excluding-intangibles. As with 
STA, Dananti et al. (2017) report that this measure of resource maximisation is a strong 
predictor of financial performance. 
8. DIS is ‘the price discount measured as the relative difference between the offer price 
and the last close price before the offer announcement’ (Asem et al. 2010). 
Chemmanur et al. (2010) conclude that the SEOs of higher-quality firms, who manage 
their resources more efficiently, will have smaller spreads and thus offer smaller 
discounts.  
9. MSEO is the number of SEOs issued over (t - 3 years). DeAngelo et al. (2007) find that 
the timing and number of SEOs are primarily determined by the issuers near-term 
liquidity needs. The data was obtained from Bloomberg, Capital IQ, and ASX archives. A 
sequence of prior SEOs infers cycles of urgent near-term illiquidity, a marker of an 




10.  ALC equals the percentage of SEO proceeds to be invested in a new project(s), as 
stated in the SEO announcement. Bayless and Jay (2013) argue that treating SEO 
proceeds as cash reserves is a non-productive use of funds. Agrawal et al. (2010) found 
that the market reaction to Australian SEOs issued to raise funds for capital 
expenditure was significantly more positive than those structured for other purposes.  
11. QR is the quick ratio defined as cash and equivalents + marketable securities + 
accounts receivable)/current liabilities. The data was obtained from Capital IQ archives. 
Gallinger (1997) considers the quick ratio a more rigorous test of a firm’s liquidity, as it 
omits both inventory and prepaid expenses. A low quick ratio may indicate that a firm 
lacks sufficient funds to meet its short-term financial obligation.  
12. DE is the total interest bearing debt (including contingent leasing liabilities) to 
shareholders’ equity ratio. Dalal (2013) reports that debt/equity levels above 0.25 are 
statistically significant predictors of increased market value.  
13. NM is the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) to gross operating revenue. 
Kim et al. (2009) show that a firm’s stock prices are highly sensitive to the firm’s profit 
margins. They find that the regression co-efficient of their sample’s sales margin (2.54) 
was up to nineteen times higher than the earnings response co-efficient for the same 
industry.  
14. WAAC is the weighted average cost of capital. We extracted each firm’s WACC from 
Bloomberg’s archival data. Bloomberg calculate a firm’s beta co-efficient by regression 
analysis before using a proprietary adjustment to ‘move’ each particular 
firm's Beta toward the market, i.e., towards a value of 1.  
A firm’s WAAC is the touchstone performance predicting financial ratio and is 
especially suited to measuring top management’s performance, as the second part of 
the WAAC formula indicates the required return to shareholders (Hyung-Il 2008; Bozec 
& Bozec 2010).  
15. TO is the rate of inventory turnover which is a direct measure of working capital 
efficiency (Padachi 2006). Mateev and Anastasov (2010) argue that the faster a firm 





16. CFA is the cash flow to assets ratio. It is a modified measure of the firm’s ability to 
maximise the ROA in the sense that the ratio is pre-tax and accommodates certain add-
backs. We calculated free cash flow by taking the firm’s earnings before interest 
and taxes and multiplied by (1 − tax rate). We then added depreciation and 
amortisation before subtracting changes in working capital and capital expenditure. 
In a contemporaneous study, McLaughlin et al. (1996) found that that 1,296 SEO firms 
listed on the NYSE experienced ‘significant post issue declines in cash flow 
performance scaled to book assets in both unadjusted and industry adjusted 
comparisons.’ Loughran and Ritter (1995) report similar findings. 
17. BMR is the book-to-market value (BMR). The book value is the accounting value of the 
firm’s tangible assets and taken from the latest annual in the report (to 30 June) in the 
period (t - 1 year). Market value is the firm’s market capitalisation at the date of SEO 
offer and is the product of the number of outstanding shares and the equity market 
price on that date. Fama and French (1992) show a strong positive relationship 
between average returns and a firm’s BMR. Exploring emerging companies, 
Rouwenhorst (1999) finds that ‘high book-to-market stocks have outperformed low 
book-to-market stocks in 16 out of 20 countries.’ Australia was not included in 
Rouwenhorst’s study.  
An inversion of the BMR, the Price/Book ratio has also been used as a proxy for 
predicting the firm’s growth (O'Brien 2003; Nezlobin et al. 2016). Nezlobin et al. (2016) 
observe that textbooks frequently ‘view a P/B ratio equal to 1 as normal,’ but argue 
that anticipated growth and profitability can push this ratio higher. Nezlobin et al. 
(2016) differentiate between the effects of past and future growth on the P/B ratio, 
holding that ceteris paribus the prospect of higher future growth is reflected in a higher 
P/B.  
18. EPS is Earnings Per Share at the SEO date. The data was extracted from the Bloomberg 
archives. Thompson (1998) holds that EPS was a valid measure of the effect of 
organisational core competence on the financial performance of the business. EPS is a 
facet of agency theory that interprets the direct effect of corporate earnings on 
individual shareholder’s interests. There is a positive and significant relationship 




Nichols and Wahlen (2004) see an investor’s desire to achieve high AR as ‘part of the 
explanation for why so many investors and analysts devote so much time and energy 
to predicting earnings.’  
19. CTP is the free cash flow to market price ratio as calculated from the last annual report 
prior to the SEO offer date. Haugen and Baker (1996) find that the cash flow to price 
ratio is the most second most powerful determinant of stock returns in a sample of 
3,000 US listed firms. 
20. SAL is the CEO’s compensation, including base salary and cash bonuses, but excluding 
superannuation, fringe benefits, stock grants, and the value of any stock options. Lilling 
(2006) found a positive relationship between a CEO‘s compensation and the market 
value of a firm, reporting that ‘the market value of a firm’s relationship with a CEO’s 
compensation is stronger than previously estimated.’  Appearing to partially counter 
Lilling (2006) findings, after controlling for firm size, Nourayi and Mintz (2008) found 
that both market and accounting-based performance measures are negatively 
correlated with long-serving CEOs’ total compensation package, regardless of length of 
experience. 
 
Strong Governance (SG) 
 
21. SEPRL is an indicator variable that equals 1 where is a separation of the role of CEO and 
Chairman at the SEO announcement, and 0 otherwise. Both the literature and industry 
have long held that, in the interests of mitigating the adverse effects of agency theory, 
the position of chairman and CEO should be held by different persons (Bosch 1995; Kiel 
& Nicholson 2003; ASX 2015).  
22. CIN is an indicator variable that equals 1 where the chairman was a non-executive 
director at the time of the SEO announcement, and 0 otherwise. Various Exchange 
sponsored governance codes, e.g., the King report on Governance for South Africa 
(King 2010) and the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2016), recommended that 
the chairperson be a non-executive director. The primary reason is to reduce agency 




executive, chairman-controlled CEO compensation better and were at a lower risk of 
informed trading. 
23. IND is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board at the time of the SEO 
announcement. The ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (ASX 2015) require that Australian-listed companies who do not 
have a majority of independent directors on their board provide cogent reasons for 
this shortcoming. Referring to IPOs as distinct from SEOs, Liao et al. (2011) suggest that 
there was a positive post listing linkage between the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board and a firm’s post-SEO performance. Referring to SEOs, Huang 
and Tompkins (2010) find that the market believes there is less likelihood that 
management will misuse the proceeds of an issue if there is a preponderance of 
independent directors on the board.  
24. PRU is the existence of a pre-SEO announcement stock price run-up. We measure it as 
the per cent change in price over the three months preceding the announcement. He 
et al. (2010) found that many SEO issuers manipulate their earnings at ‘around the 
time of the issuance,’ which is reflected in a ‘a stock price that is temporarily 
overvalued.’ An unexplained run-up in equity prices pre-SEO announcement may 
suggest earnings management (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; Wen-Ben et al. 2013). 
However, in their SEO event study, Huang, Uchida and Zha Huang et al. (2015) find pre-
SEO price run-up also to be consistent with investor sentiment. Another explanation 
could be related to insiders trading as with pre-takeover price run-ups.  
25. PE is the absolute number of ‘please explain’ requests (n) from the ASX relating to lack 
of disclosure explaining aberrant trading patterns during the period (t - 1 year). The 
data was obtained from the firm’s announcements to the ASX. This is a direct measure 
of potential breaches of continuous disclosure, a basic tenet of governance. Jackson et 
al. (2008) demonstrate a positive link between poor disclosure practices and stock 
price volatility. 
26. OWN is the percentage of the company’s market equity actually owned by directors as 
distinct from the incentive of their stock options. The data was taken from the Director 




Joseph (2011) show that if the percentage of directors’ owned equity falls in the range 
of 30-50%, it directly correlates with adverse agency influence and weak governance. 
27. CSR We measured the firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 in cases where the firm issues a CSR audit, and a 0 otherwise. An 
early study by Cochran and Wood (1984) found only a weak correlation between 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and financial performance. However, a more 
recent study by Lee (2014) argues that CSR is not only an integral part of strong 
governance, but positively contributes to corporate financial performance.  
28. OPT represents the number of options held by the CEO as a percentage of his/her 
monetary compensation package. The literature (Meek et al. 2007; Sawers et al. 2011) 
accepts stock options as an element of pay-for-performance compensation. Gong 
(2011) finds that applying a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity to CEO 
compensation is associated with higher realised pay and higher abnormal stock 
returns. However, Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) show that stock options granted to CEOs 
of stagnant firms may precipitate risky behaviour that breaches good governance. 
CEO stock options are therefore an ambiguous proxy, in that their execution 
negatively correlates with good governance but positively correlates with financial 
performance. 
 
Explicit Industry Knowledge (EIK) 
29. EDU is the total number of tertiary degrees held by board members. We obtained the 
data from the last annual report for the period (t - 1 year). We score an indicator 
variable that equals 1 per degree or a 0 otherwise. Darmadi (2013) reports that the 
educational qualifications of board members can affect ROA and contribute to 
explaining Tobin’s Q. 
30. EXP is the number of years of industry-specific experience accumulated by the non-
executive members of the Board. We obtained this data from resumes contained in 
last annual report prior to (t). We posit that Boards with a majority of non-executive 
members with little related industry experience are more likely to approve 




involved. Lai et al. (2014) find that the quantum of a director’s industry related outside 
experience is positively related to increased revenue emanating from strategic 
decisions. Le et al. (2012) report that non-executive board members with industry-
specific experience have a positive impact on the quality of industry-specific human 
capital in the TMT, and thus influence financial performance.  
     Clements et al. (2015) also confirm that a significant positive relationship exists 
between a director’s related industry experience and corporate governance 
effectiveness. Importantly for this study, they found that the quantum of a director’s 
industry related experience was likely to have the greatest impact on small rather than 
large companies’ performance.  
31. EDUC is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO holds a university degree at 
the time of the SEO announcement, and 0 otherwise. Arthur et al. (2012) observe that 
education is not the most frequently cited determinant of entrepreneurial success, but 
that it does rate highly in comparison to others. Pascal et al. (2017) conducted an 
empirical study that showed that CEOs who had a business education performed 
significantly better financially than those who did not. King et al. (2016) examined the 
value of an industry-specific tertiary education on a CEO’s performance, concluding 
that there is an ‘emerging consensus in the literature that the education of the CEO is a 
factor in explaining performance differentials.’ 
32. EDUR is an indicator variable that equals one for each university degree the CEO holds 
that is technically related to their firm’s industry. For an unrelated degree, or no 
degree, the score is zero. This measure differentiates between a generalist degree 
(e.g., an MBA) and a specialist degree (e.g., a Batchelor of Geology or Science in a 
Resource firm). The literature (Baruch et al. 2005; Datta & Iskendar-Datta 2014) 
suggests that an MBA is more financially rewarding to its holder, and CEOs with 
generalist degrees are more sought after than those with specialist degrees. However, 
in terms of performance, an earlier Canadian business media report (Keller 1999) 
found that specialist degrees such as engineering, rather than MBAs, are the hallmark 




33.  CEO is the number of years of the CEO’s industry-specific experience. The data was 
obtained from directors resumes published in the firm’s latest annual report in the 
period (t - 1 year). The depth of a CEO’s industry-specific experience is positively 
related to a firm’s performance (Stone & Tudor 2005; Rodenbach & Brettel 2012; King 
et al. 2016). Stone and Tudor (2005) carried out an in-depth survey of the CEOs of fifty-
eight publicly traded US corporations and report that the ‘level’ and ‘intensity’ of a 
CEO’s specific industry experience at executive level may significantly impact financial 
performance. Stone and Tudor (2005) conclude that generic management experience 
does not appear to positively impact ROA. 
34. SERV is the CEO’s tenure with the firm measured in years. The data was obtained from 
directors’ resumes published in the firm’s latest annual report in the period (t - 1 
year). This proxy assumes that familiarity with a specific firm asset enhances a CEO’s 
ability to generate AR for that firm. However, extended tenure also has implications of 
excessive compensation and ‘staleness,’ leading to poor strategic decisions (Miller 
1991; Nourayi & Mintz 2008). As far as we could ascertain, this proxy had not been 
previously tested against AR in an Australian study. 
35. IL was measured by a Factiva search of the Australian Financial Review, the Australian 
and Sydney Morning Herald, and other credible business media for the number of 
times ‘industry leader,’ ‘leading company,’ or ‘leading firm’ appeared in references to 
each firm.  
      Williams and Sun (2015) found that industry leaders ‘are more likely to beat analyst’s 
expectations than non-industry leaders.’ 
36. TRN is the expenditure as a percentage of revenue on formal training programs for 
employees. It was measured as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where the 
firm conducts such programs e.g., apprenticeships, and 0 otherwise. The data was 
obtained from the firm’s latest annual report in the period (t - 1 year). 
Extant literature linking training to SME performance is sparse and ambiguous. Cosh et 
al. (1998) find that training ‘in aggregate is significantly and positively associated with 
higher sales growth,’ but did not specify the type or duration of training. Jayawarna et 




formal and targeted to industry-specific needs. Jayawarna et al. (2007) found that 
generic training is unlikely to provide significant performance benefits. 
Patton et al. (2000) described formal job-specific training as ‘initiatives which can be 
identified by both recipients and deliverers as an intervention which has a structured 
mode of delivery, where the aim is to impart new awareness or knowledge of a 
workplace process or activity.’ Patton et al. (2000) found little empirical evidence to 
support the intuitive perception that an investment in job-specific training will 
enhance SME performance. 
However, linking training to SME e-commerce, Eikebrokk and Olsen (2009) found a 
positive relationship between training, competence, and business performance. They 
conclude that the quantum of training explains ‘variances in e-business competencies 
and performance in terms of efficiency and novelty.’ Their findings align with Cosh et 
al. (1998)’s earlier study. 
This study’s attempt to link expenditure on industry related training with Australian 
AR breaks new ground.  
37. INST is the total number of recognised industry-specific institutions that each board 
member is a Fellow of. The data was obtained from the firm’s latest annual report in 
the period (t - 1 year). Granting the status of Fellow in a recognised industry institution 
implies screening for a high level of industry expertise and training. This intuitive proxy 
has no known literature support, but anecdotally is widely accepted as a marker of 
industry-specific expertise. 
 
Adaptability to Change (ADP) 
38. RG3 is the revenue growth for the period (t - 36). The revenue growth was obtained 
from Capital IQ archives. This proxy assumes that unpredictable exogenous changes 
and pressures put a given market in a continuous state of flux, requiring constant 
adaptations to maintain revenue growth. Thornhill (2006) found that in volatile 
environments, innovative firms ‘are likely to enjoy revenue growth, irrespective of the 




39. CHN is measured by the number of previous times the firm’s CEO at time (t) had 
previously been a CEO or equivalent of a listed company. We acknowledge that if the 
changes were bought about by dismissal, an inverse relationship would exist, thus such 
changes were excluded from our data. The data was acquired from the latest annual 
report in (t - 1 year). Berger et al. (2001) and Elsaid (2015) showed that a CEO’s 
experience can influence their dynamic capabilities. 
40. REP, the firm’s reputation, was measured by a Factiva search of the Australian 
Financial Review, the Australian and Sydney Morning Herald prior to time (t) for the 
reputational context in which the company’s name was mentioned, if at all. The 
published reputation was measured on a similar scale to that adopted by Cianci and 
Kaplan (2010). The measurements were ‘Unfavourable (Score -1), ‘N/A’ (Score 0), 
‘Neither favourable or unfavourable’ (Score 1), ‘Favourable’ (Score 2). Earlier studies 
suggested a strong relationship between a firm’s reputation and its future financial 
performance (Roberts & Dowling 2002; Eberl & Schwaiger 2005). Schürmann 
(2006) demonstrated that reputation may not be persistent. A more recent study 
by Wang and Berens (2015) finds that amongst large corporations, a positive ethical 
and economic public reputation contributes to superior corporate financial 
performance. Two more recent studies (Turyakira et al. 2012; Maldonado-Guzmán et 
al. 2017) found that a significant positive relationship between an SME’s reputation is 
its financial performance. 
41. REPC is a measure of the CEO’s reputation. We employed a Factiva search of the 
national, capital city, and regional business publications prior to time (t) for the 
reputational context in which the CEO was associated with the firm or their preceding 
role. The measurements were ‘Unfavourable (Score -1), ‘N/A’ (Score 0), ‘Neither 
favourable or unfavourable’ (Score 1), ‘Favourable’ (Score 2). Cianci and Kaplan 
(2010) demonstrate that ‘judgements about the company’s future performance and 
management’s reputation are consequential, in that they are associated with 
investment decisions.’ More recently, Fetscherin (2015) found that a CEO’s reputation 





42. LDR is transformational leadership measured as the CEO’s ability to imbue his 
organisation with an entrepreneurial culture of adaptive pre-eminence that delivers 
profitable innovation in the face of adversity (Papalexandris & Galanaki 2008; Seah et 
al. 2014). This proxy is corporately internalised to actually deliver financial 
performance, rather just than the intangible expectations that stem from a favourable 
exogenous reputation. We employed a Factiva search of the financial media over the 
period (t - 3 years) to assess the CEO’s transformational leadership ability by 
interpreting the context in which the words ‘leader’ or ‘leadership’ or similar were 
associated with their name. The measurements were ‘Unfavourable (Score -1), ‘N/A’ 
(Score 0), ‘Neither favourable or unfavourable’ (Score 1), ‘Favourable’ (Score 2).  
Chen (2009) contends that the transmission mechanism of entrepreneurship lies in 
‘understanding its integration effect in a dynamic environment.’ Chen (2009) is saying 
that a CEO’s financial or marketing entrepreneurship is leveraged by the ability to 
imbue it into the entire organisation.  
43. VAL is the value of acquisitions made in period (t - 3 years) expressed as a % of total 
assets taken from the last annual report for the period (t - 1 year). The information is 
obtained from Annual Reports and ASX disclosure announcements for the period (t - 3 
years). Laamanen (1999) perceives acquisitions as a strategy to acquire new 
technology or enter a new market. We therefore employ a history of acquisitions as a 
proxy for adaptability, although Lester and Lipinksi (2015) observed that there is a 
dearth of literature on SMEs acquiring SMEs.  
44. MKT is the percent of revenue committed to marketing averaged over three years. It 
was obtained from the three annual reports for period (t - 3 years). A strong, persistent 
financial commitment to marketing indicates an ability to anticipate and adapt to 
change (Breznik & Lahovnik 2016). 
45. DIS is the disposal of legacy or non-core assets over the period (t - 3 years) expressed 
as a percentage of tangible assets stated in the last Annual Report in the period (t - 1 
year). The value of the liquidated assets for the period (t - 3 years) was obtained from 
Morningstar Data Analysis, Capital IQ, and cash flow statements in the Annual reports. 
The disposal of obsolete or non-core legacy assets indicates an ability to recognise and 




46. GLBL is the existence of a revenue generating offshore subsidiary or operation as 
recorded in the latest Annual report for period (t - 1 year). It was measured as an 
indicator variable that equals 2 in cases where the firm has a profitable foreign 
operation (s) and 1 otherwise. Al-Mubarak (2016) argues that a substantial adaptive 
competency is required for a small firm to establish financially successful foreign 
operations. He observes that the challenges facing small companies going global 
include coping with ‘cultural and social differences, regulations and legal environment 
and marketing products internationally.’  
47. THN is the policy to acquire new strategic human capital to meet changing markets and 
technology. The measure was taken from the careers functionality of the firm’s 
website, investor presentations, and ASX market announcements for the period (t - 3 
years). It was measured as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where the firm 
continually seeks new highly qualified human capital, and a 0 if the firm had no clearly 
defined policy of doing so. Gardner (2002) observed that ambitious ‘firms compete 
aggressively to acquire and retain talent to maintain operations and continue to grow.’ 
48. CON is the policy to hire specialist consultants to obtain the expertise to adapt to 
changing markets and technology. The measure was taken from the annual reports, 
investor presentations, and ASX market announcements for the period (t - 3 years). It 
was measured as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where the firm has a 
policy of hiring consultants for specific tasks and 0 where there was no indication of 
the existence of such a policy. Calvin (1995) observes that ‘consultants are perceived as 
a tangible way to improve small business performance.’ More recently a study by Chen 
et al. (2011) finds ‘strong evidence that the adoption of management consultants has a 
positive effect on firm performance.’ 
49. TT is external technology rights accessed or licensed (as distinct from being 
endogenously created) in the period (t - 3 years). It was measured as an indicator 
variable that equals 1 in cases where the firm pays royalties or fees to access 
intellectual property (IP), and a 0 otherwise. The data was obtained from annual 
reports, investor presentations, and ASX announcements for the period (t - 3 years). 
Colombo and Filippini (2016) found that patent licencing plays a crucial role in the 




is a direct measure of a firm’s ability to access emerging technology (Adams et al. 
2006).  
50. IT is the strategic implementation of IT and digital resource management solutions. It 
was measured as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where the firm utilises or 
intends to utilise high level CRM or similar resource orientated management software 
during the period (t - 1 year), and a 0 otherwise. Definitive data for the period (t - 1 
year) was obtained through annual reports, the firm’s investor relations department, 
and investor presentations. Mazzarol (2015) posits that digital technology offers small 
and medium-sized companies the opportunity to adopt the automated strategies that 
were previously the preserve of larger companies. The adoption of digital technologies 
induces a competitive advantage (Bilgihan & Wang 2016), and is therefore a 
meaningful proxy for the competency of adaptation to change.  
51. DIV is the extent of diversification of the firm’s products or services. Coad and 
Guenther (2013) define ‘major’ diversification as ‘expanding the product portfolio into 
new submarkets.’ We measured it as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where 
the firm products or services were marketed to clearly delineated submarkets during 
the period (t - 1 year), and a 0 otherwise. The data was obtained by reviewing the 
subject’s pre-SEO revenue statements, investor presentations, and website. Successful 
diversification demands an adaptive TMT and hence is a proxy for a firm’s adaptive 
ability. A body of literature links the longitudinal effects of a diversification strategy to 
enhanced financial performance (Palich et al. 2000; Bausch & Pils 2009; Benito-Osorio 
et al. 2012). Using a curvilinearity model, Palich et al. (2000) reported ‘performance 
increases as firms shift from single-business strategies to related diversification.’ 
52. CUS is the influence of customer satisfaction on refining existing or creating new 
products or services designed to lift financial performance. A relatively new concept of 
this factor is termed ‘product fluidity,’ a measure that captures changes made to rival 
products in response to market (customer) demand (Hoberg et al. 2014). 
52)  We measured it as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where there was a 
formal structure in place to solicit customer feed-back during the period (t - 1 year), 
and a 0 otherwise. We inspected the firm’s website for evidence of formal customer 




on product development from social media, investor presentations, and executive 
postings in the latest annual report for the period (t - 1 year).  
LoPreiato (2016) correlates customer satisfaction scores with the financial 
performance measures of technology companies and finds a positive relationship. In a 
study of Australian SMEs, Gadenne and Sharma (2009) concluded that ‘customer 
involvement appears to be important in maintaining a competitive edge in terms of a 
return on assets.’ Ogawa and Piller (2006) demonstrated a financial risk mitigating 





Innovation (INN)  
53) PAT is the number of patents or copyrights lodged or granted during the period (t -
  36). This information was obtained from investor presentations, annual reports and IP 
Australia for the period. A series of case studies by Chen and Wu (2007) suggested that 
an R&D capability is not only a source of innovation but is ‘regarded as the most 
important source of core competence both by high-tech firms and traditional 
manufacturers.’ Bhaumik et al. (2009) assert that the grant of patents is an empirical 
measure of the effectiveness of R&D expenditure. Note that the perceived value of a 
patent may degrade if it is not commercialized within a reasonable time frame, but if it 
is commercialised, its corporate value will increase (Schürmann 2006; Sichelman 2010). 
54) DRP is the presence or recognition of a disruptive innovation in the firm’s (t - 3 years) 
strategies to achieve competitive advantage. The data was sourced from the firm’s 
website, investor presentations, and annual reports for the period (t - 3 years). It was 
measured as an indicator variable that equals 1 in cases where the firm created, 
adopted, or intended to adopt a disruptive innovation, and a 0 otherwise. Bower and 
Christensen (1995) defined disruptive innovation as new technologies that can create 
new markets or radically change, or disrupt, the status quo in existing markets. 
Schmidt and Druehl (2008) found that when the disruptive innovation is ‘one of high-
end encroachment, the impact on the current market is immediate and striking.’ Nagy 
et al. (2016) suggest that a ‘failure to predict disruptive innovation can have inimical 
consequences for market incumbents.’   
Christensen (2015) most recent study suggests that disruptive innovations are more 
likely to gestate in smaller or newer firms struggling to obtain a foothold in a mature 
market dominated by large incumbents. 
 
The descriptive statistics for the fifty-four proxies for the five core competency dimensions 
described above are summarised in Table 4.2. (Please note that this table will also serve as a 
reference for keeping track of variable names in the results sections.) 
 




 Table 4.2 Core competency proxies.  
Core Competency Categories Variable Code N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Resource maximisation (RM) Cash conversion cycle CCC 63 31.28 252.16 
 
Ratio of long-term debt to equity LTE 63 0.14 0.24 
 
Gross margin ratio GM 63 2.27 11.45 
 
Ratio of equity to fixed assets RFA 63 0.56 0.79 
 
Ratio of sales to fixed assets SFA 63 17.14 54.02 
 
Ratio of short-term debt to total assets STA 63 0.03 0.05 
 
Ratio of long-term debt to total assets LTTA 63 0.08 0.13 
 
% Discount on shares offered at SEO DIS 63 0.01 0.04 
 
No of SEOs ante current SEO MSEO 63 0.75 0.93 
 
Allocation of SEO proceeds ALC 63 0.44 0.41 
 
Quick ratio QR 63 3.61 4.23 
 
Debt/Equity ratio DE 63 0.26 0.91 
 
Ratio of EBIT to gross revenue NM 63 -8.32 27.16 
 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital WAAC 63 10.86 4.36 
 
Inventory turnover ITO 63 8.32 28.96 
 
Cash flow to total assets ratio CFA 63 -0.22 0.67 
 
Book-to-market ratio BMR 63 1.28 2.13 
 
Earnings per Share EPS 63 -0.15 6.19 
 
Cashflow to price ratio CTP 63 -36.33 88.61 
 
CEO's base salary and bonuses SAL 63 0.55 0.40 
Strong governance (SG) Separation of role of chairman & CEO SEPRL 63 0.81 0.50 
 
Is the chair an independent director CIN 63 0.81 0.40 
 
Proportion of independent directors IND 63 0.70 0.16 
 
Pre-SEO stock price run-up PRU 63 -0.01 0.34 
 
ASX notification of possible infringement PE 63 0.13 0.38 
 
Percentage of Firm owned by directors OWN 63 0.11 0.15 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility CSR 63 0.00 0.00 
 
Number of options held by CEO OPT 63 1.60 2.89 
Explicit Industry knowledge (EIK) No of degrees held by board EDU 63 3.19 1.87 
 
Total of years industry experience at Board EXP 63 79.08 41.63 
 
CEO's Tertiary Qualifications EDUC 63 1.24 0.86 
 
CEO's Relevant Tertiary Qualifications EDUR 63 0.79 0.77 
 
CEO's specific industry experience CEO 63 18.87 10.18 
 
CEO's years of service with firm SERV 63 5.68 6.10 
 
Recognised leaders in their industry RL 63 0.62 0.94 
 
Amount of revenue committed to training TRN 63 0.21 0.41 
 
High level membership industry institutions INST 63 1.13 1.20 
Adaptability to change (ADP) Revenue growth prev 3 years RG3 63 0.43 1.02 
 
CEO's churn history CHN 63 2.13 1.82 
 
Corporate reputation REP 63 0.89 1.19 
 
CEO's Reputation REPC 63 1.44 0.82 
 
CEO's transformational leadership LDR 63 1.13 0.77 
 
Value of acquisitions or mergers undertaken VAL 63 0.07 0.23 
 
% of revenue committed to marketing MKT 63 0.00 0.01 
 
Disposal of poorly performing assets DIL 63 0.00 0.02 
 
Offshore presence/Export Orientation GLBL 63 0.60 0.49 
 
Acquire strategic human capital THN 63 0.51 0.50 
 
Hire specialist consultants CON 63 0.49 0.50 
 
Technology transfer TT 63 0.21 0.41 
 
Strategic implementation of IT IT 63 0.52 0.53 
 
Diversification of products DIV 63 0.30 0.46 
 
Customer involvement CUS 63 0.44 0.53 
Innovation (INN) No of patents or copyrights lodged PAT 63 0.37 0.75 
 
Creation of a disruptive technology DRP 63 0.11 0.32 
Abnormal Return - Short Term 
 
AR1 63 0.34 1.01 
Abnormal Return - Long Term 
 
AR3 63 0.63 1.75 
Return on Assets - Short Term 
 
ROA1 63 -0.27 1.07 
Return on Assets - Long Term 
 





4.5.5 Predictive equation construction 
H2 holds that if the core competency determinants are significant predictors of financial 
performance, they can be transformed into an equation capable of classifying the firm as a 
cherry or a lemon. The cherries are firms predicted to achieve high levels of financial 
performance, and the lemons vice versa.  
 
Although our study uses both ROA and AR as comparative measures of financial 
performance, we focus our predictive modelling on market performance. We examine both 
high versus low short and long-term AR. Contemporary behavioural finance literature 
suggests that small-cap investors seek AR rather than fundamental value. Prospect theory 
holds that small-cap investors do not follow the rational analysis protocols and assumptions 
that utility theory expects of professional fund managers (Park & Sohn 2013). They are more 
likely to be motivated by high short-run returns, and it is well documented that small-cap 
stocks can provide AR (Levy & Levy 2011). We produce two predictive models: one predicts 
short-term AR and one predicts long-term AR. The predictive models objective classifies our 
sixty-three sample firms as cherries or lemons based on the respective discriminant 
predictive score.  
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Pearson Correlations 
We removed proxy CSR from the listed proxies, as none of the firms in our sample 
undertook a Corporate Social Responsibility audit. Table 4.3 presents correlations between 
the fifty-three remaining independent variables and the four dependent variables. The 
dozens of significant correlations among the independent variables suggests the potential 
for factor analysis for variable reduction. We found twenty-two sets of statistically 
significant correlations with the dependent variables. AR were significantly and positively 
correlated with the quick ratio, revenue growth over the three years ex-ante the SEO, the 





Table 4.3 Pearson correlation coefficients 
 Table 4.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
CCC LTE GM RFA SFA STA LTTA DIS MSEO ALC QR DE NM WACC ITO CFA BMR EPS CTP SAL SEPRL CIN IND EM PE OWN OPT
CCC 1.00 0.01 -0.19 -0.16 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.02 -0.23 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.06 -0.12 0.08 0.06 0.22 -0.06














-0.17 -0.04 0.24 -0.12




-0.06 -0.24 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
RFA -0.16 -0.04 -0.12 1.00 -0.21 0.06 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.06 -0.11 0.13 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.09 0.08 0.12 -0.16 -0.01 0.28
*
-0.15 -0.13
SFA 0.15 0.24 -0.03 -0.21 1.00 -0.08 0.25
*
0.04 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.16 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.12 -0.06 -0.18  -0.26
*
-0.04 0.22 -0.10 0.00 0.06
STA 0.11 0.27
*
0.06 0.06 -0.08 1.00 0.07 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10  -0.30
*
0.21 0.18  -0.34
**





0.07 1.00 0.16 0.05 -0.02  -0.30
*
0.24 0.19  -0.32
*




-0.03 0.00 0.18 -0.06 -0.11 0.33
**
-0.13
DIS 0.02 0.12 -0.06 -0.16 0.04 -0.13 0.16 1.00 0.08 0.24 -0.14 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.60
**
-0.01 0.13 0.09 0.13 -0.11 0.11 0.19 -0.07 0.14 0.35
**
MSEO 0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 0.05 0.08 1.00 0.17 -0.03 0.12 0.07 0.13 -0.20 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.13 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.26
*
ALC 0.15 -0.09 -0.19 0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.24 0.17 1.00 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 0.23 -0.07 -0.01 0.18
QR 0.04  -0.35
**









-0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.21 0.24 0.09 0.12 -0.03 -0.13 1.00 0.05 -0.21 0.07 0.86
**
0.15 -0.05 0.09 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.01








0.05 0.13 0.05 0.08 -0.21 0.11 1.00 -0.08 -0.21 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.16
ITO -0.01 0.15 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.16 0.13 0.05 -0.20 0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.09 -0.08 1.00 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.15 -0.05 -0.08 0.04 -0.04
CFA 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.86
**
0.02 -0.21 0.08 1.00 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.18 -0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.01
BMR -0.07 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.60
**
-0.02 0.08 -0.19 0.15 0.12 0.04 -0.05 0.09 1.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.17 0.06 0.17 -0.12 -0.07 0.38
**
EPS 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.26
*
-0.01 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.02 1.00 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.21 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.39
**
0.06
CTP 0.05 -0.07 0.07 -0.14 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.13 -0.18 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.19 -0.06 -0.02 1.00  -0.30
*





-0.15 0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.27
*
0.09 -0.18 0.06 -0.12 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.09  -0.30
*
1.00 0.06 0.17 0.19 -0.15 -0.01 -0.14 -0.20
SEPRL 0.14 -0.08  -0.36
**
0.08 -0.18 0.22 -0.03 0.13 -0.17 -0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.09 -0.11 0.05 0.16 -0.03 0.06 1.00 0.79
**
0.18 -0.06 0.13 0.20 -0.04




0.19 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 0.12 -0.09 -0.17 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.79
**
1.00 0.22 0.00 0.16 0.15 -0.19
IND -0.12 0.27
*
-0.06 -0.16 -0.04 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.05 -0.12 -0.25 0.08 0.13 -0.09 0.15 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.19 0.18 0.22 1.00 -0.21 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11
EM 0.08 -0.17 -0.24 -0.01 0.22 -0.06 -0.06 0.19 0.03 0.23 0.36
**
-0.04 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.26
*
-0.15 -0.06 0.00 -0.21 1.00 0.06 -0.03 0.01
PE 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.28
*
-0.10 0.07 -0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.16 -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.13 0.16 -0.10 0.06 1.00 -0.12 0.12
OWN 0.22 0.24 -0.05 -0.15 0.00 0.09 0.33
**
0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.39
**
0.17 -0.14 0.20 0.15 -0.12 -0.03 -0.12 1.00 -0.06




0.18 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 0.38
**
0.06 -0.10 -0.20 -0.04 -0.19 -0.11 0.01 0.12 -0.06 1.00








Table 4.3 Continued 
 Table 4.3 Continued
CCC LTE GM RFA SFA STA LTTA DIS MSEO ALC QR DE NM WACC ITO CFA BMR EPS CTP SAL SEPRL CIN IND EM PE OWN OPT
EDU -0.01 0.06 0.27
*
0.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.13 0.18 -0.05 -0.21 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.06 -0.21 0.25
*
0.04 -0.06 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.06
EXP -0.15 0.28
*
0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.15 0.03 -0.12 -0.16  -0.30
*
0.13 0.04 0.13 0.22 0.12 -0.01 0.18 -0.19 0.28
*





EDUC 0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 0.03  -0.25
*




0.08 -0.09 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.26
*
-0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.23
EDUR 0.11 0.07 -0.18 -0.06 0.03 0.24 0.11 0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 0.37
**








-0.12 0.09 0.09 -0.12
CEO -0.10 0.19 0.03 -0.07 0.13 -0.11 0.15 -0.04 -0.20 0.03 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 0.20 0.02 -0.07 0.12 0.11 -0.11 0.35
**
-0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.19 0.11 0.11 0.02
SERV 0.14 0.09 0.06 -0.10 -0.04 .379
**
0.12 0.04 -0.14 0.20 -0.16 -0.03 0.16 -0.14 0.25 0.03 0.12 0.08 -0.05 0.24 0.06 0.15 -0.03 0.07 -0.11 .257
*
-0.10










0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.06 -0.13 0.06 -0.09
TRN 0.11 0.25
*
-0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.25
*




-0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.03
INST -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.22 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.17 -0.03 0.12 0.04 -0.06 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.25
*
0.21 -0.03 -0.15
RG3 0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 0.15 0.00 -0.08 -0.12 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.12 0.07 0.16 -0.16 0.13 0.13 0.26
*
0.10 -0.08 0.01 -0.07
CHN -0.24 -0.01 -0.11 0.12 -0.06 -0.17 -0.09 -0.18 -0.09 -0.20 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.27
*
0.05 0.00 0.12 -0.14 -0.22 0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.01  -0.25
*
0.00 -0.02 0.01
REP 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.02 -0.10 0.22 -0.03 0.14 -0.09 0.12 0.05 0.28
*
-0.14 0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.02
REPC 0.06 0.01 -0.23 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.23 0.11 -0.03 0.28
*
-0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.12 -0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07
LDR 0.06 0.03  -0.26
*
0.02 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.28
*
0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.23 0.19 0.07 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.06
VAL -0.08 0.26
*
-0.04 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.14 0.16 -0.10 0.00 -0.17 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.44
**
0.17 0.12 -0.01 0.13 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.27
*
0.01
MKT 0.23 -0.10 0.21 -0.21 0.06 0.15 -0.15 0.27
*





-0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.16 -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.06 -0.13  -0.44
**
-0.24 0.05 -0.15 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03
GLBL 0.00 -0.13 0.15 -0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.19  -0.25
*
-0.15 -0.04 0.08 -0.22 -0.12 -0.11 0.05 -0.16 0.12 0.08 -0.16 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.27
*
-0.21 0.10  -0.32
*
-0.02
THN -0.05 0.09 -0.17 -0.23 0.18 -0.09 0.18 0.28
*
-0.10 0.00 -0.17 0.16 -0.06 -0.11 -0.10 0.15 0.12 -0.24 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.08  -0.26
*
-0.03 -0.05
CON 0.07 0.23 -0.03 -0.08 0.19 0.28
*
0.17 0.09 0.00 -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 -0.01 -0.19 0.05 -0.08 0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.10 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.07
TT -0.01 -0.19 0.18 -0.18 -0.04 0.00 -0.21 -0.15 0.10 0.10 0.15 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.11 -0.06
IT 0.07 0.17 -0.17  -0.44
**
-0.01 -0.02 0.19 0.20 -0.02 0.20 0.01 -0.10 0.06 -0.21 0.22 -0.12 0.12 -0.03 -0.09 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.02  -0.25
*
0.10 -0.10
DIV 0.10 0.06 -0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.27
*
-0.08 -0.15 0.15 -0.16 0.04  -0.27
*
0.12 -0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.12 -0.04 0.09 0.06
CUS 0.02 0.21 0.06 -0.19 0.25
*
0.23 0.22 0.21 -0.22 0.21 -0.13 -0.03 0.10  -0.28
*
0.25 -0.05 0.12 0.23 0.24 0.16 -0.04 0.03 0.20 0.08 -0.12 0.07 -0.16
PAT 0.25
*
-0.19 0.15  -0.33
**
-0.03 0.07 -0.20 -0.14 0.14 0.02 0.18 -0.15 -0.06 -0.13 0.21 -0.14 0.12 -0.12 0.14  -0.27
*
-0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.17 -0.12 -0.16
DRP 0.21 -0.15 0.15 -0.15 -0.08 0.07 -0.16 -0.10 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.19 -0.10 0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.24 0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.03
AR1 0.05 -0.20 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.16 -0.12 -0.16 -0.04 0.15 0.28
*
-0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.18 -0.07 0.05
AR3 0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.15 0.11 -0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.18  -0.28
*
-0.15 -0.17 0.12 0.02 -0.03  -0.26
*
0.11 0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.14 0.02 0.05
ROA1 0.05 0.16 -0.06 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.90
**
0.09 -0.18 0.09 0.93
**
0.12 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04
ROA3 -0.09 0.18 0.01 0.26
*
0.03 0.14 0.19 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 0.67
**
0.07 -0.11 0.01 0.80
**
0.12 0.10 0.13 0.18 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 0.04 0.17 0.14 -0.02










Table 4.3 Continued 
 
EDU EXP EDUC EDUR CEO SERV IL TRN INST RG3 CHN REP REPC LDR VAL MKT DIL GLBL THN CON TT IT DIV CUS PAT DRP AR1 AR3 ROA1 ROA3
CCC -0.01 -0.15 0.06 0.11 -0.10 0.14 0.18 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.24 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.23  -0.29* 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.10 0.02  0.25
*
0.21 0.05 0.09 0.05 -0.09
LTE 0.06 0.28
*
-0.04 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.25
*
0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.26
*
-0.10 -0.06 -0.13 0.09 0.23 -0.19 0.17 0.06 0.21 -0.19 -0.15 -0.20 -0.04 0.16 0.18
GM 0.27
*




0.15 -0.17 -0.03 0.18 -0.17 -0.12 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 0.01
RFA 0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10  -0.33
**
-0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.12 -0.11 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.21 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 -0.08 -0.18  -0.44
**
-0.10 -0.19  -0.33
**
-0.15 -0.02 -0.06 0.18 0.26
*
SFA -0.04 -0.08 0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.37
**
-0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.18 0.19 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.25
*
-0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.03
STA -0.16 0.08 0.08 0.24 -0.11 0.38
**
0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.15 -0.17 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.23 0.15 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 0.28
*
0.00 -0.02 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.07 -0.16 0.04 0.07 0.14
LTTA 0.13 0.15 -0.05 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.25
*
-0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.14 -0.15 -0.02 -0.19 0.18 0.17 -0.21 0.19 0.02 0.22 -0.20 -0.16 -0.12 -0.04 0.19 0.19






0.09 -0.15 0.20 0.18 0.21 -0.14 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15 0.07 0.06
MSEO -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 -0.20 -0.14 -0.17 0.01 -0.22 -0.12 -0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.15 -0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.22 0.14 0.15 -0.04 0.11 0.01 -0.04
ALC -0.21 -0.16 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.14 -0.20 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.21 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.10 0.20 0.27
*
0.21 0.02 0.21 0.15 -0.06 0.10 -0.05
QR -0.06  -0.30
*
0.03 -0.16 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.22 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.17 0.02 -0.09 0.08 -0.17 -0.05 0.15 0.01 -0.08 -0.13 0.18 0.07 0.28
*
0.06 0.02 -0.13
DE 0.02 0.13  -0.25
*
0.02 -0.13 -0.03  -0.30
*








0.09 0.10 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.18 0.09 0.07
WACC -0.03 0.13 -0.03 -0.15 0.20 -0.14  -0.25
*
-0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.27
*
-0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.20 0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 -0.01 -0.21 -0.16  -0.28
*
-0.13 -0.10 -0.06  -0.28
*
-0.18 -0.11
ITO 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.37
**
0.02 0.25 0.11 0.06 0.17 -0.02 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.44
**
-0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.25 0.21 0.19 -0.02 -0.15 0.09 0.01
CFA 0.09 0.12  -0.29
*
-0.07 -0.07 0.03  -0.29
*
0.13 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.04 0.05 -0.16 0.15 -0.08 -0.01 -0.12  -0.27
*




BMR 0.13 -0.01  -0.27
*
-0.17 0.12 -0.04 -0.17 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 0.14 0.13 0.14 -0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 0.15 0.08 -0.21 -0.16 -0.22 -0.11 0.07 0.10
EPS 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.14 0.05 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.24 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.23 -0.12 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.10
CTP -0.21 -0.19 -0.09 0.04 -0.11 -0.05 0.13 -0.13 -0.06 0.16 -0.22 0.28
*











0.14 -0.16 0.06 -0.14 0.14 0.06 0.03 -0.14 -0.13 0.07 0.00 0.13 -0.01 0.25 -0.11 0.16  -0.27
*
-0.24 0.00  -0.26
*
0.18 0.18
SEPRL 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.27
*
-0.03 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.13 -0.08 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.01 0.12  -0.44
**
0.08 0.01 0.18 -0.12 0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.00 -0.02
CIN -0.06 0.08 0.18 0.40
**
0.04 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.22 0.13 -0.10 0.02 0.12 0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -0.24 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.12 0.10 -0.02 -0.04








-0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.15 0.05 0.27
*
0.14 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.11 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.03 -0.10
EM -0.04  -0.27
*




0.08 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0.17 -0.15 -0.21 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.04
PE -0.03 0.28
*
0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.11 -0.13 0.04 0.21 -0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 0.10  -0.26
*
-0.08 -0.17  -0.25
*
-0.04 -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 0.01 0.17
OWN -0.11 0.19 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.26
*
0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.27
*
0.25 -0.08  -0.32
*
-0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.12 -0.15 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.14















Table 4.3 Continued 
EDU EXP EDUC EDUR CEO SERV IL TRN INST RG3 CHN REP REPC LDR VAL MKT DIL GLBL THN CON TT IT DIV CUS PAT DRP AR1 AR3 ROA1 ROA3




-0.15 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.20 -0.09 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.02 0.19 -0.03 0.11 -0.14 -0.13 0.01 -0.06 -0.14 -0.14 0.09 0.11
EXP 0.17 1.00 -0.04 0.08 0.49
**






-0.24 0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.11 -0.11  -0.33
**
-0.06 -0.17 -0.13 -0.22 -0.16 -0.22  -0.28
*
0.12 0.21
EDUC -0.02 -0.04 1.00 0.50
**
-0.19 -0.02 0.15 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.20 -0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.34
**
0.05 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.07 -0.05 -0.24 -0.23
EDUR 0.12 0.08 0.50
**
1.00 0.03 0.13 0.27
*
0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.15 -0.01 0.15 0.21 -0.03 -0.18 -0.12 0.16 -0.06 0.18 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.07
CEO -0.01 0.49
**
-0.19 0.03 1.00 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.11  -0.33
**
0.01 -0.10  -0.27
*
-0.12 -0.01 -0.08 0.14 0.02 -0.19 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.15 -0.17  -0.27
*
-0.04 -0.24 -0.09 0.05
SERV 0.14 0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.12 1.00 .305
*
0.21 0.17 -0.14 -0.18 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.03 .334
**
0.03 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.05 .349
**
0.16 0.20 -0.06 -0.07 -0.20 -0.19 0.01 0.06






0.13 0.22 -0.07 0.35
**



























-0.01 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.34
**
1.00 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.24  -0.31
*
-0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.00 -0.24 -0.19 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.16  -0.32
*
-0.02 0.13
RG3 -0.15 -0.14 0.04 0.05  -0.33
**









0.06 -0.15 0.01 -0.18 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.05 1.00 -0.13 0.06 0.14 0.12 -0.23 -0.11 0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.21 0.05  -0.37
**
-0.23 -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.01
REP -0.03 -0.21 0.15 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.35
**








0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05
REPC 0.03  -0.26
*
0.21 0.15  -0.27
*








0.15 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.16 -0.02 0.08 -0.08






1.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.19 -0.03 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.25
*
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04
VAL -0.09 0.06 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 0.02 -0.04 0-.25
*
-0.11 0.12 -0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.19 0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 0.08 0.13
MKT 0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.18 -0.08 0.33
**
0.06 0.14 0.15 -0.07 -0.23 0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.02 1.00 -0.05 -0.07 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.26
*
0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.02 -0.21 0.05 0.01
DIL 0.20 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 0.14 0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.14 -0.24 -0.19 -0.04 -0.05 1.00 0.06 -0.10 -0.15 0.23 -0.15 -0.04 0.11 0.09 -0.05 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01
GLBL 0.12 0.08 0.34
**
0.16 0.02 0.01 0.19 -0.15 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.13 0.00 -0.03  -0.25
*
-0.07 0.06 1.00 -0.15 0.02 0.17 -0.06 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.29
*
0.21 0.13 -0.18 -0.25




0.02 0.05 -0.16  -0.26
*
-0.14 -0.08 0.16 0.08
CON 0.19 -0.11 0.21 0.18 -0.11 0.07 0.27
*
0.13 -0.19 0.10 -0.02 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.12 0.01 -0.15 0.02 0.27
*
1.00 -0.03 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.11 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.14 -0.12
TT -0.03  -0.33
**
0.18 0.19 -0.01 0.05 0.29
*
-0.07 -0.05 0.15 -0.21 0.25 0.25
*













0.24 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.27
*
0.15 0.10 0.18 -0.15 -0.06 0.31
*




0.20 0.03 0.08 0.10 -0.07 -0.22
DIV -0.14 -0.17 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.38
**
-0.08 0.05 0.12  -0.37
**
0.15 0.15 0.16 -0.02 0.26
*






0.24 0.21 0.08 0.16 -0.22  -0.35
**
CUS -0.13 -0.13 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.41
**










1.00 0.23 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11






0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.22 -0.16 0.11 0.44
**




0.17 -0.23  -0.46
**
DRP -0.06 -0.16 0.08 0.03  -0.27
*
-0.07 0.09 -0.18 -0.08 0.38
**












AR1 -0.14 -0.22 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.20 0.01 -0.19 -0.16 0.30
*
-0.10 0.01 0.16 0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.21 -0.14 -0.07 0.43
**







AR3 -0.14  -0.28
*
-0.05 0.02 -0.24 -0.19 0.00 -0.24  -0.32
*





ROA1 0.09 0.12 -0.24 -0.03 -0.09 0.01  -0.31
*
0.18 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.06 -0.18 0.16 -0.14 0.00 -0.07 -0.22 -0.08 -0.23 -0.06 0.04 -0.07 1.00 0.79
**
ROA3 0.11 0.21 -0.23 0.07 0.05 0.06  -0.29
*


























AR were significantly and negatively correlated with WAAC, the CEO’s base salary and 
bonuses, the years of industry-specific experience at Board Level, and the directors’ high-
level membership of industry institutions. ROAs were significantly correlated with the ratio 
of equity to fixed assets, the debt/equity ratio and the cash flow to assets ratio. ROAs were 
significantly and negatively correlated with the perception that the firms were leaders in 
their industry, diversification of products, the number of patents or copyrights lodged, and 
the creation or adoption of a disruptive technology.  
 
4.6.2 Regressions 
We grouped the remaining fifty-three proxies under their relevant core competency group. 
We then executed four separate Multiple Linear Regressions (five models in each 
regression, each representing a core competency group) against the four dependent 
variables. The regressions are depicted in Tables 4.4 to 4.7. We depicted significance levels 
by converting the P values to * for significance at the 10% level, ** for significance at the 5% 
level, and *** for significance at the 1% level and report standardised betas.  
Table 4.4 shows seven statistically significant predictors of short-term AR (t + 1) while 
controlling for size and industry. Model 1 covering resource maximisation depicts the CEO’s 
base salary and bonuses as significant. Model 2, covering strong governance finds that ASX 
‘please explain’ requests are significant. Model 4 shows that revenue growth over the three 
years ex-ante SEO and technology transfer are significant adaptability measures significant. 
None of the explicit industry knowledge or innovation variables are significant in Models 3 






Table 4.4 Short-term abnormal returns: Dependent variable is AR1 
Short-	Term	Abnormal	Returns:	Dependent	Variable	is	AR1
b t b t b t b t b t
2.12** 0.70 1.93 * 0.83 -0.03
0.14 0.74 0.06 0.46 0.05 0.37 -0.14 -0.71 0.12 0.92





























































INN	 PAT 0.15 0.90
DRP 0.20 1.40










Table 4.5 depicts the nine statistically significant predictors of long-term (t + 3) ARs. After 
controlling for size and industry in Model 1, debt/equity ratio, the weighted average cost of 
capital, and the cash flow to total assets, ratio resource maximisation variables are all 
significant. For Model 3, the explicit industry knowledge variables capturing the CEO’s 
general tertiary qualification and the CEO’s industry-specific tertiary qualifications are 
significant. Model 4 finds the firm’s reputation, an adaptability measure, is significant. 
Finally, Model 5 finds the two innovation variables, the number of patents it lodged and the 
creation or adoption of a disruptive technology, are both significant. None of the 
governance variables are significant in Model 2.  
 
Table 4.6 presents the fourteen statistically significant predictors of the ROA reported the 
year after the SEO (t + 1). Model 1 finds several resource maximisation variables significant 
after controlling for industry and size. They are Gross Margin, Short-term Debt to Total 
Assets, the discount offered on shares at SEO, the number of prior SEOs, the debt/equity 
ratio, the ratio of EBIT to gross revenue, the Cash flow to total assets ratio, the book-to-
market ratio, and earnings per share. Model 3 shows the CEO’s tertiary qualifications, the 
CEO’s specific industry experience, and whether the firm is perceived as an industry leader. 
All are significant explicit industry knowledge variables. Two adaptability variables, 
technology transfer and diversification of products, are significant in Model 4. No 
governance or innovation variables are significant in Models 3 and 5 respectively. 
 
The smaller number of statistically significant predictors of the three-year post-SEO ROA, 
are depicted in Table 4.7. They are the cash flow to total assets ratio (resource maximisation 
Model 1), and technology transfer and the diversification of products (adaptability Model 4). 
After controlling for industry and size, none of the other variables are significant predictors 
in Models 1 to 5. 
 
This provides partial support for H1; aspects of four of the core competencies are positively 
related to ex-post-SEO financial performance. Surprisingly, there is not a significant positive 





Table 4.5 Long-term abnormal returns: Dependent variable is AR3 
Long	-	Term	Abnormal	Returns:	Dependent	Variable	is	AR3
b t	 b t	 b t	 b t	 b t	
4.06 *** 1.30 3.95 *** 2.01 * 0.54
0.78 0.22 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.16 -0.18 -0.98 -0.10 -0.84
-0.71 0.74*** -0.51 -4.30*** -0.50 -3.47 *** -0.52 -4.18 *** -0.54 -4.49 ***













WACC -0.31 -2.35 **
ITO -0.13 -1.21












EIK	 EDU -0.02 -0.19
EXP 0.08 0.56
EDUC -0.25 -1.86 *





































Table 4.6 Short-term return on assets: Dependent variable is ROA  
Short	Term	Return	on	Assets:	Dependent	Variable	is	ROA	1
b t	 b t	 b t	 b t	 b t	
-0.11 -0.89 -0.98 -0.79 -2.98
***
0.09 1.96 ** 0.00 0.03 -0.12 -0.99 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.04








RM CCC -0.03 -0.74
LTE -0.06 -0.81
GM -0.07 -1.89 *
RFA 0.04 1.05
SFA 0.04 1.16
STA -0.07 -1.70 *
LTTA 0.00 0.02
DIS 0.10 2.11 **
MSEO -0.10 -2.69 **
ALC 0.08 2.18
QR 0.02 0.40
DE 0.48 6.47 ***
NM 0.10 2.99 ***
WACC -0.05 -1.15
ITO -0.01 -0.17
CFA 0.55 6.57 ***
BMR -0.13 -2.94 ***







































INN	 PAT -0.07 -0.42
DRP 0.13 0.94










Table 4.7 Long-term return on assets: Dependent variable is ROA 3 
Long	Term	Return	on	Assets:	Dependent	Variable	is		ROA	3




0.16 1.39 0.09 0.80 -0.02 -0.17 0.12 0.70 0.04 0.36





























































INN	 PAT -0.15 -1.02
DRP -0.12 -0.94
0.06 0.13 0.01 0.20 0.17Adj	R	Square
Log	Total	Assets
Industry






4.6.3 Data reduction: Factors 
One issue with the regression analysis is the large number of predictor variables relative to 
the number of cases. To address this issue, we conduct a factor analysis to identify the 
underlying dimensions or factors in the predictor variables. Table 4.8 presents our rotated 
component matrix for each of the five dimensions measured by the fifty-three variables 
with the significant variables shaded. As the innovation dimension comprises only two 
variables, these two variables were kept to represent that dimension. The remaining fifty-
one variables are factor analysed to identify eleven factors that can be used to represent 
the underlying dimensions resource maximisation, explicit industry knowledge, and 
adaptability. The Bartlett’s tests of sphericity are all significant at p < 0.01, indicating that 
that factor analysis may prove to be useful for variable reduction. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) Test values are all at or near 0.5, revealing that the sample size is adequate but 
on the small side.  
 
There is debate in the literature as to how to select the number of underlying factors. In the 
context of the current study, the objective of the exploratory factor analysis is variable 
reduction to a smaller set of common dimensions to employ in the subsequent predictive 
modelling. The default Kaiser criterion of selecting factors where the eigenvalue is greater 
than one, while common, is not necessarily the best one. Sometimes, the Kaiser criterion 
results in too many factors and sometime too few. Many experts (Cattell 1966; Streiner 
1994) recommend the scree test and exercising judgement over the break in the scree (the 
slope of the scree plot) as the indicator of how many factors to extract. This thesis adopts a 
combination approach and selects factors with eigenvalues greater than one and which fall 
in the scree up to the factor after the first break in the scree. For one dimension, explicit 
industry knowledge, there is no one clear break in the scree (see Figure 4.4), so the 
eigenvalue greater than one criterion dominates the identification of the factors. While this 
approach is somewhat judgmental, it is considered appropriate given the exploratory nature 
of the research and given that the objective is not the factors per se but developing an initial 
predictive model. Extensive testing of the factor structure is beyond the scope of the 





The resource maximisation dimension (RM) variables are largely the traditional accounting 
measures of a firm’s ability to maximise or leverage its financial resources. The group was 
reduced to two factors based on the scree plot (see Figure 4.2). The first factor, labelled 
‘Leverage,’ reflects the financial advantage attendant to maximising financial resources. The 
second factor is termed ‘Market Valuation,’ and represents the materialisation of financial 
advantage. The heaviest loadings on the Leverage factor are five accounting measures that 
capture aspects of leverage. The heaviest loadings on the market valuation factor are two 
market-related measures, the SEO discount, and the book-to-market ratio.  
 
The strong governance dimensions (SG) reduced to two factors, based on the scree plot (see 
Figure 4.3). The first factor is termed ‘Chair Independence,’ to denote the importance of an 
independent chairman and board of directors in ensuring strong governance. Its two 
heaviest loadings concerned the chairman’s independence. The second factor is termed 
‘Agency,’ because the two heaviest loading components are linked to earning’s 
management and ASX warnings, both of which can be related to agency theory and costs.  
 
The explicit industry knowledge dimension is captured by nine proxy variables (EIK). The 
scree plot (see Figure 4.4) identified that these variables reduced to four factors: 
‘Qualifications,’ ‘Experience,’ ‘Education,’ and ‘Leadership.’ The labels are based on the high 






















Figure 4.4 Scree plot for explicit industry knowledge 
 
 




underlying variables capturing qualifications, experience, education, and leadership. As 
Table 4.8 shows, each factor had at least two strong component loadings.  
 
The adaptive dimension includes sixteen proxy variables (ADP). The scree plot (see Figure 
4.5) identified that these variables reduced to three factors labelled ‘Reputation,’ 
‘Adaptability,’ and ‘Leverage Resources.’ The last mentioned referred to maximising non-
monetary resources, the heaviest loadings being Global Presence, acquiring Strategic 
Human Capital, and the strategic implementation of Information Technology. The 
reputation variables all loaded on the Reputation factor and the variables relating to 
product, customer, technology, and people adaptability all loaded on the Adaptability 
factor.  
 
The principle components analysis reduced the fifty-three variables across the five 
dimensions into thirteen reduced measures. These comprise the eleven factors shown in 
Table 4.8, plus the two innovation variables that capture the innovation dimension. 
Henceforth, these will be referred to as the thirteen factors, albeit the last two are the 
captured variables and the other eleven are rotated factors.  
 
Table 4.9 presents regression analyses of the ability of the thirteen factors to predict the 
four different dependent variables: Model 1 shows short-term abnormal returns (AR1), 
Model 2 shows long-term abnormal returns (AR3), Model 3 shows short-term return on 
assets (ROA1), and Model 4 shows long-term return on assets (ROA3). Model 1 has a low 
goodness of fit (adjusted R2 of only 12%), and none of the factors nor the industry or size 
controls statistically significant relationship with one-year post-SEO abnormal. Model 2 
demonstrates a much higher goodness of fit (adjusted R2 of 38%) when using long-term AR 
as the dependent variable. Leverage, Chair Independence, and Disruptive Technology are 
significantly positively related while Patents and the control for size (log of total assets) are 
significantly negatively related to three-year post-SEO abnormal return (at P < .05 or lower). 
In addition, Model 3 also shows a higher goodness of fit (adjusted R2 of 43%) when using 
short-term ROA as the dependent variable. The control for size (log of total assets), and the 
factors Leverage, Reputation, and Adaptability, are significant and positively related to one-




related to short-term ROA (P < .10 level). Finally, Model 4 also shows a similar goodness of 
fit (adjusted R2 of 43%) using long-term ROAs as the dependent variable. Only three factors, 
Leverage, Agency, and CEO Leadership, along with the control for size, were significant. 
Overall, goodness of fit was higher using ROA, rather than abnormal returns model, and for 
long-term over short-term measures for the dependent variables.  
 




4.6.4 Predictive modelling 
The second hypothesis of the study is that the five core competencies can feed into a 
predictive equation capable of predicting post-SEO financial performance in terms of AR, 
i.e., whether a firm is a cherry or a lemon. There are two ways we could potentially build a 
predictive model: (1) use the thirteen factors identified above to represent the five core 
competencies (or underlying dimensions) to estimate a model that predicts future 
performance; (2) retain all the information in the data and use all fifty-three variables to 
estimate a model that predicts post-SEO performance. In this study, we take the second 




which variables best predict short-term and long-term market performance. That is, the SEO 
abnormal return both short-term one-year and long-term three-years post-SEO.  
 
We broadly adopt the approach of Ou and Penman (1989) in that we use all the available 
data and variables to build the model. This means that we do not impose any researcher 
bias in terms of dimensions or variables. Instead, we let the data direct the analysis with our 
focus on predictive ability rather than theory testing. We use discriminant analysis rather 
than logistic regression because the former is more robust with smaller sample sizes. In 
addition, the resultant discriminant function is more familiar to financial professionals that 
already use the likes of Altman’s Z-score model (readily available in data feeds like 
Bloomberg). Using discriminant analysis has some potential weaknesses relative to logistic 
regression where the independent variables are not multivariate normal. It is also 
acknowledged that different estimation techniques may result in different input variables, 
parameters, and prediction rates. An accumulating body of neural network research 
suggests these approaches challenge traditional discriminant analysis and logistic regression 
(West et al. 1997; Teshnizi & Ayatollahi 2015). Nevertheless, stepwise, discriminant analysis 
serves the purpose of testing out hypotheses to determine whether or not the core 
competencies can be combined to predict lemons versus cherries. The research objective is 
not to produce the best model; it is to show that predictive modelling is possible.  
 
The first step in the analysis is to split the potential SEOs into lemons and cherries. The 
sample is divided into thirds, based initially on the one-year post-SEO abnormal return, then 
again into thirds based on the three-year returns. We use the two extreme groups for each 
variable (one and three-year post-SEO abnormal return) to represent the lemons (the 
bottom third) and cherries (the top third). The middle group is excluded as we want a model 
that identifies the extremes rather than the middle group. We can also use the middle 
group to test the estimated model upon. The lemons (bottom third) are coded as 1 and the 
cherries (top third) are coded as 2 in the discriminant analysis. 
 
Initially, we test the difference between the lemons and cherries on each of the fifty-three 
independent predictor variables as predictors. The Analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Table 




statistically significant predictor of one-year lemons was a high number of ‘please explain’ 
notices from the ASX. The statistically significant predictors of one-year cherries were was 
the adoption of new technology by transfer or license (PE), the adoption of or creation of a 
disruptive technology (DRP), and the lodgement and approval of technology patents (PAT). 
 
The strength of their ‘F’ statistic shows that the quantum of the CEO’s salary, the years of 
experience of the board members, and their high-ranking membership of industry 
associations are statistically significant predictors of three-year lemons. Predictors of three-
year cherries are the quick ratio (QR), the CEO’s specific industry experience, the length of 
the CEO’s tenure with the firm (SERV), the percentage of revenue spent on industry-specific 
training (TRN), the percentage of revenue spent on marketing (MKT), a strategic imperative 
to acquire effective human capital (THN), the adoption of or creation of a disruptive 






Table 4.10 ANOVA of proxies for lemons versus cherries (short and long-term) 
F Sig. F Sig.
RM CCC 0.001 0.976 0.937 0.339
LTE 1.252 0.270 0.996 0.324
GM 0.865 0.358 2.102 0.155
RFA 0.900 0.348 0.030 0.863
SFA 0.193 0.663 0.003 0.959
STA 2.789 0.103 0.501 0.483
LTTA 0.002 0.967 0.006 0.941
DIS 1.036 0.315 0.317 0.577
MSEO 0.015 0.905 1.086 0.304
ALC 0.505 0.481 0.038 0.847
QR 1.043 0.313 2.962 0.093
*
DE 0.599 0.443 0.470 0.497
NM 0.006 0.939 0.614 0.438
WACC 1.409 0.242 2.202 0.145
ITO 0.014 0.905 1.487 0.230
CFA 0.542 0.466 2.189 0.147
BMR 2.583 0.116 0.618 0.436
EPS 1.673 0.203 0.101 0.753
CTP 1.986 0.166 0.361 0.551
SAL 2.614 0.114 3.853 0.056
*
SG SEPRL 0.068 0.796 0.725 0.399
CIN 0.004 0.952 0.197 0.659
IND 0.681 0.414 2.248 0.141




OWN 0.156 0.695 0.113 0.738
OPT 0.010 0.921 0.228 0.636
EIK EDU 1.132 0.294 1.467 0.233
EXP 1.327 0.256 9.482 0.004
***
EDUC 0.046 0.831 0.047 0.830
EDUR 1.655 0.206 0.241 0.626
CEO 0.325 0.572 3.494 0.069
*
SERV 1.685 0.202 4.821 0.034
**
IL 0.010 0.920 0.010 0.920
TRN 2.739 0.106 7.215 0.010
**
INST 0.459 0.502 3.641 0.063
*
ADP RG3 0.676 0.416 0.543 0.466
CHN 2.726 0.106 0.329 0.569
REP 0.590 0.447 0.253 0.618
REPC 0.381 0.540 0.076 0.785
LDR 0.354 0.555 0.114 0.737
VAL 1.754 0.193 0.065 0.800
MKT 0.107 0.745 4.539 0.039
**
DIL 0.956 0.334 1.041 0.314
GLBL 1.274 0.266 0.178 0.675
THN 0.549 0.463 2.861 0.098
*




IT 0.453 0.505 0.188 0.667
DIV 1.411 0.242 0.329 0.569
CUS 0.178 0.676 0.016 0.900





















4.5.4.1 Short-term abnormal return predictive model 
 
Table 4.11 reports the discriminant function coefficients from a stepwise discriminant 
analysis of all fifty-three variables to predict one-year lemon versus cherry categories (top 
and bottom thirds of one-year post-SEO abnormal return). The resulting discriminant 
function predicts within sample the Lemons (Group 1, the low short-term AR) and Cherries 
(Group 2, the short-term AR) with a 74.4% accuracy (see Table 4.12). The predicted score for 
each firm comprises a constant, in this case a negative, plus the coefficient times the firm 
specific value of four common underlying variables, the latter metric determining whether 
the firm will morph as a cherry or a lemon at (t +1). Positive scores are cherries while 
negative scores are lemons. 
 
Prediction Score = -3.947 + (0.105 x EPS) + (-0.666 x EDUR) + (1.537 x TT) + (2.147 x DRP)         [2] 
 
Where  EPS = Earnings per share 
 EDUR = CEO's Relevant Tertiary Qualifications 
 TT = Technology transfer 
 DRP = Creation of a disruptive technology 
 
Table 4.11 Discriminant function 1-Year abnormal return cherries versus lemons 
  Coefficient     
(Constant) -3.947 
  EPS 0.105 
 
 EDUR -0.666 
 
 TT 1.537 
 
 DRP 2.147     
Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
.633 17.822 4 .001 
 
 
Table 4.12 Classification results of cherries versus lemons 
 
1-Year Abnormal Return Groups 





1 18 3 21 
2 8 14 22 
% 
1 85.7 14.3 100.0 
2 36.4 63.6 100.0 
 
1 = Low 1-Year AR Group 




Table 4.13 depicts the predicted discriminant score versus the actual group membership of 
the lemons (coded as 1) and cherries (coded as 2). All of the lemons have a score of less 
than zero, except for two which have a positive score, implying they are not lemons. A 
number of the cherries have score that are negative, implying that they are lemons. 
However, above the value of 1.0 on the discriminant function, all identified cherries are 
actually cherries, suggesting that this should be the decision rule to apply to the short-term 
AR predictive model. This is shown visually in Figure 4.6.  
 
The development of these predictive models provides support for H2 that the five core 
competencies can be combined to predict post-SEO financial performance identifying 




































































































































4.6.4.2 Long-term abnormal return predictive model 
 
Table 4.14 reports the Discriminant Function Coefficients from a stepwise discriminant 
analysis of all fifty-three variables to predict three-year lemon versus cherry categories (top 
and bottom thirds of three-year post-SEO abnormal return). 
 











Lambda Chi-square df Sig.





The resulting discriminant function predicts within sample the Lemons (Group 1, the low 3-
Year AR) and Cherries (Group 2, the high 3-Year AR) with a 95.2% accuracy (see Table 4.15).  
 
Table 4.15 Classification results to differentiate cherries versus lemons 
3-Year Abnormal Return Groups 





1 20 1 21 
2 1 21 22 
% 
1 95.2 4.8 100.0 
2 4.5 95.5 100.0 
 
1 = Low 3-Year AR Group 
2 = High 3-Year AR Group 
 
The three-year model encompasses seven underlying variables. Pre-SEO earnings per share 
(EPS) is the only predictor variable common to both short and long-term abnormal return 
prediction models. Inserting EPS and the other six predictor variables into the model 




with negatives being cherries and positives being lemons. That is, in contrast to the short-
term model, a negative coefficient indicates high performance. 
 
Long-term Predictive Score = -7.116 + (0.033 x GM) + (0.133 x WAAC) + (0.071 x 
EPS) + (-4.247 x OWN) + (0.054 x CEO) + (76.541 x MKT) + (1.986 x THN) + ( 1.155 x 
Log Total Assets) [3] 
   Where  GM Gross margin ratio 
 
WAAC Weighted average cost of capital 
 
EPS Earnings per share 
 
OWN Percentage of firm owned by directors 
 
CEO CEO's specific industry experience 
 
MKT percent of revenue committed to marketing 
 
THN Acquire strategic human capital 
 
TA Log of total assets 
 
The resulting discriminant prediction scores for three-year AR are displayed in Table 4.16. To 
assist interpretation and comparability with the short-term model, the scores are all 
multiplied by negative one. The effect is to rescale the scores so that the lemons are the 
largely negatives (one exception) and the cherries are the positives.  
 
The scores denoting lemons scale up from 3.981 to a maximum of 0.238. The scores 
identifying cherries scale up from 0.069 to a maximum of 3.061. At a score of less than -0.5 
(i.e., between -0.32 and -0.609), all predicted cherries are actually cherries. Figure 4.7 shows 
that only one lemon had a predicted discriminant score greater than zero (i.e., in the cherry 
range which is negative for the three-year abnormal return model). Applying the cut-off 
value of 0.5 would result in no lemons being incorrectly identified as cherries in the model 







Table 4.16 Long-term abnormal return predicted score group versus actual group      
 





























































































































4.7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Even with a market price for the firm’s stock, potential investors in the small-cap SEO market face 
significant market information asymmetry. The lemons problem is even more pronounced in the 
small-cap SEO market as there is no coverage by research analysts that helps keep the large public 
equity markets ‘efficient.’ Consequently, investors will have to carry out their own analysis on the 
firm’s financial condition and future prospects, based on more limited publicly-available 
information.  
 
Based on Myers and Majluf (1984), investors may conclude that firms are timing their SEO at a 
time when the firm is overvalued, and that inside managers and owners have valuable 
information about their firm’s value. Without the assistance from research analysts, investors do 
not know if a small-cap’s stock price reflects all averse non-public information. From the investor 
side, the costs required for potential investors to collect and assess all of this information would 
be prohibitively high. 
 
4.7.1  Hypothesis No 1. 
We emphasise that Hypothesis H1 was formed from an investor’s perspective as distinct from an 
employees’ or customers’ perspective. Successful organisational performance from an employee’s 
perspective may have very different connotations from investors. An investor’s primary focus is 
on financial returns. H1 suggested that regardless of how financial performance is measured, it is 
determined by the metrics of the same core competencies.  
 
Our results do not support this hypothesised commonality of performance determinants. We 
observed that while the basic inter-item correlation between some of the independent variables 
is significant, the correlation between the two short-term dependent variables is insignificant. For 
example, the relationship between a firm’s status as an industry leader (IL) and its customer 
orientation (CUS), is significant, but the relationship between the firms short-term ROA and short-
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term ARs is insignificant at 0.039. In short, ROA and ARs are two quite different measures of 
financial performance, whose determinants have little in common. 
We regressed the independent variables of each of the five predictor groups of core 
competencies against the two classes of dependent variables. The results (see Table 4.5) show 
that while there are five significant non-accounting based predictors of short-term ROA, the 
dominant predictors of short-term ROA are nine accounting-based variables. Four of them, the 
short-term debt to total assets ratio, the number of recent SEOs, the book-to-market ratio, and 
the gross margin ratio, are significantly but negatively correlated to short-term ROA. The 
remaining accounting-based variables (discount offered on shares at SEO, the debt/equity ratio, 
EBIT as a percentage of revenue, and the ratio of free cash-flow to assets) are positively and 
significantly correlated with short-term ROA.  
Our finding that gross margin is negatively correlated to ROA may appear counter-intuitive, but 
the phenomenon can be explained by the tendency of industries under intense competitive 
pressure to discount prices to increase sales (thus lower the gross margin in percentage terms). 
The increased sales may translate to a greater utilisation of assets and an over-recovery of 
overheads that increases ROA. 
In spite of their ability to predict short-term ROA, accounting-based predictor variables appear 
ineffective as determinants of long-term ROA, being replaced by two adaptive variables: 
technology transfer and the diversification of products. With the exception of the CEO’s salary, no 
accounting-based variables are significant predictors of short-term AR, but three of them, the 
debt/equity ratio, WAAC, and free cash flow to assets, were significant predictors of long-term 
ARs. A closer examination of the correlation of the free cash flow to assets in each case offers a 
plausible explanation of this anomaly. The free cash flow to total assets (CFA) is a significant and 
positively correlated predictor of both short and long-term ROA (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). This is in 
line with the expectation that as CFA increases, it will be manifested by an improved ROA. 
However, substituting ARs for ROA, we find that the CFA is also a significant negatively correlated 







Lam et al. (2015) show that a low CFA (manifested as a low cash holding) is positively correlated 
with future ARs, as the value of the firm increases over time from an initial undervaluation. Lam et 
al. (2015) advance a behavioural explanation for the initial undervaluation of the firm, saying that 
it stems from an investor’s perception of ‘real illiquidity associated with low cash holdings.’ 
 
The results (see Table 4.3) also show that none of the traditional accounting-based predictors of 
short-term ROA are predictors of short-term ARs. A strong governance variable, ‘please explain’ 
requests from the ASX are a significant negatively related predictor of short-term ARs. Three 
industry-explicit knowledge proxies, the CEO’s tertiary qualifications, the status of the firm as an 
industry leader, and the percentage of revenue allocated to industry training, are significantly and 
positively correlated predictors of short-term ARs. Three years ex-ante the SEO revenue growth 
and technology transfer are significant adaptive group predictors of short-term ARs.  
 
Only one significant predictor of short-term ARs, the CEO’s tertiary education qualifications, 
carried through as a predictor of long-term ARs. Perversely, a firm’s good reputation and the 
number of patents it had lodged were significantly but negatively correlated with long-term ARs. 
We surmise that three years post-SEO, the firm’s reputation at time ‘t’ may be of little 
consequence if its patents proved difficult to commercialise. The CEO’s industry-specific 
education is also a significant but negatively correlated predictor of ARs. It may be linked to the 
positive significant correlation of disruptive technology with long-term ARs. As technology 
advances at an exponential rate, an older technical education may prove unable to cope with the 
latest developments. 
 
When the fifty-three variables are factor analysed into eleven factors allocated over the five core 
competency dimensions (see Table 7), we find that nine of the eleven factors are non-accounting 
based. Some of these nine factors are qualitative in construct, e.g., reputation, but we viewed 
them as predictors of ARs in the sense that ARs have a behavioural or qualitative input (Levy & 






short-term ARs, as none of the thirteen factors has a statistically significant relationship with this 
independent variable (See Table 4.8). However, when the thirteen (eleven factors plus two 
variables) factors were regressed against long-term ARs, using log of Total Assets as a control for 
size, Table 9 shows that the log of total assets, leverage, chair independence, and disruptive 
technology are significantly and positively related to the dependent variable. This result supports 
H1 for long-term ARs. 
 
When we regress the thirteen factors against short-term ROA after controlling for size (see Table 
4.10), we find that five factors, leverage, reputation, CEO education, CEO leadership, and 
adaptability are significantly and positively related to short-term ROAs. This wider spread of 
factors supports the tenets of H1. Regression of the thirteen factors against long-term ROA (see 
Table 4.11) also showed support for H1. Again, the log of total assets emerged as significant 
control for size and leverage, agency, and CEO Leadership were positively and significantly related 
to the long-term ROA. This result supports both our previous regressions, showing that 
accounting-based metrics (the Leverage factor) are significant predictors of short and long-term 
ROA.  
 
4.7.2  Hypothesis No 2. 
Our second hypothesis states that the metrics of each of the five groups of competencies can be 
combined in a predictive equation capable of predicting the short and long-term ARs. The 
quantum of the predictive score will assist an investor to identify his targeted investment as 
either a cherry or a lemon. We employed stepwise discriminant analysis for this task rather than 
logistic regression since the former is considered to be more robust with relatively small sample 
sizes, as is the case with Press and Wilson (1978). The independent variables were ex-post-SEO 
short and long-term ARs. We devised two extreme groups for each variable, the cherries 
represented by the top one third scores and the lemons by the bottom one third scores. We 
excluded middle-ranking scores, reasoning that investors were only interested in identifying 
cherries or lemons. 
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Our stepwise discriminant analysis of all fifty-three variables produced discriminant coefficients 
where (see Table 4.10) the lemons (predicted low short-term ARs) were termed Group 1, and the 
cherries (predicted high short-term ARs) were termed Group 2. The predicted score for each 
firm’s short-term AR comprises a constant, in this case a negative, plus the coefficient times the 
firm specific value of four common underlying variables. The latter metric determines whether 
the firm will morph into a cherry or a lemon at (t + 1). Positive prediction scores are cherries and 
negative scores are lemons. The four variables generating each predictive score are earnings per 
share, the CEO’s relevant tertiary education, technology transfer, and the adoption of a disruptive 
technology. The predictive function (see Equation 2) predicts (within sample) lemons (Group 1, 
the low short-term ARs) and cherries (Group 2, the short-term ARs) with 74.4% accuracy. We 
apply the same discriminate methodology to derive the predictive scores for long-term ARs (see 
Table 4.14). The resulting long-term discriminant scores for the sample predict the lemons (Group 
1, the low long-term ARs) and cherries (Group 2, the high long-term ARs) with a 95.3% accuracy 
(see Table 4.15). A predictive model (see Equation [3]) yielding a 95.3% accuracy strongly supports 
H2. 
The scores produced by the predictive models are useful to investors as a ranking tool to identify 
which firms are more likely to be lemons or cherries or somewhere in between. The important 
question is whether or not the model can be used to formulate a trading strategy, and what are 
the potential economic returns from the strategy. To investigate this, we computed the long run 
discriminant score for all sixty-three sample firm SEOs based on Equation 3. Table 4.17 presents 
the minimum, maximum, and average three-year AR for each partition of the sample.  








In interpreting the results in Table 4.17, it should be noted that these are abnormal returns. That 
is, the percentage change in the price for the stock over the holding period less the percentage 
change in the small-cap index over the same period. Hence it is possible for a company to have a 
negative return in a period where the market has a positive return and as a result the abnormal 
return, the difference between the two, is then more than negative 100 percent. For example, 
Case 8 in the data, the company return for 3 years is -91.9%. The return on the SPAXEC index for 
the same period is 19.7%. So the abnormal return (company return less the index return) is -
111.6%. 
 
The sample is partitioned into the High and Low AR3 group, which are the top and bottom third of 
the SEO sample based on three-year AR, and are the extreme groups used to estimate the 
discriminant function. The Middle AR3 group are the SEOs that were excluded from the 
estimation. Table 4.17 shows that the average return for the top third of SEOs was 247% over the 
three-year post-SEO holding period. Whereas the lemons, the low AR3 group, lost on average 
67.8%. The Middle AR3 group on average just about broke even with a negative 2.4% abnormal. A 
hedge portfolio of investing in the High AR3 group and selling short the Low AR3 group results in 
an average abnormal return of 314.8%.  
 
But this investment strategy presupposes investors know the group membership. If investors 
simply followed the ranking of the prediction index and bought predicted cherries (negative 
scores) and short sold lemons (positive prediction scores), then the return would be lower due to 
the misclassified firms. When we applied this approach, the full sample of sixty-three SEOs the 
average abnormal return using only the prediction score classification (not post-performance 
Actual Group Min Return Max Return Average Return
High AR3 Group 72.3% 743.5% 247.0%
Middle AR3 Group -34.1% 53.7% -2.4%
Low AR3 Group -111.6% -34.7% -67.8%
Hedge Porfolio* 314.8%
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actual classification) is 205.1%. While this is less than the hedge portfolio, it is still a considerable 
return and comprises 170.3% return from the predicted cherries and a short-sell return of 34.8 % 
from the lemons. 
The wealth impact of the prediction index can also be demonstrated by focusing on the middle 
group of SEOs. If investors naively applied the classifications index, whereby they invest in 
negative prediction scores and sell short positive prediction scores for the twenty SEOs that were 
in the middle group, then they will have a pattern of gains and losses and missed gains and losses 
averted that make up the average 2.4% loss for the middle companies. Table 4.18 summarises the 
pattern of returns for the middle third of the sample where investment decision is based on the 
classification index prediction.  
Table 4.18. Classification index versus actual long-term AR of middle third 
As the index only classifies eight of the twenty middle SEOs correctly (i.e. seven predicted lemons 
are lemons and one predicted cherry is a cherry), and the rest are the opposite of the predictions, 
we get four different payoff cells. Selling short the lemons produces a gain of 15.1%, assuming an 
equally weighted investment. Selling short the five predicted lemons that are actually cherries 
produces a loss (missed gain) of 34.8%. Buying all the predicted cherries produces again only one 
actual cherry of 32%, but also a loss of seven actual lemons. Hence, applying the index to all the 














Avoid LOSS on Lemon 7 7
GAIN on Cherry 1 1
LOSS on Lemon 7 7
Miss GAIN on Cherry 5 5






the classification index is applied, there is evidence that investors can earn an abnormal return 
from employing investment strategies based on the index predictions. 
 
Although our study incorporated fifty-three distinct variables, investors need only focus on the 
handful of those factors (total assets, leverage [including cost of capital], chair independence, 
patents, and disruptive technologies) that were significant in determining long-term abnormal 
returns. This study also helps clarify the complex contribution of financial ratios and core 
competency attributes in determining future performance.   
4.8 Conclusion 
 
The results showed a significant correlation between the predictive ability of financial statement 
metrics and one independent variable, short-term ROA. The resource maximisation group (RM) 
was the dominant group of core competency variables able to predict a firm’s short-term ROA. 
This group contained basic accounting measures of performance. However, the ability of the 
same group of variables to predict long-term ROA lapsed to the point of insignificance.  
 
Virtually none of the independent variables that demonstrated an ability to predict short or long-
term ROAs were significant AR predictors. However, the variables that could predict AR’s were 
spread more evenly across the five competency groups. Curiously, a higher number of 
independent variables were able to predict long-term ARs than the number able to predict short-
term ARs. Furthermore, few of the variables able to predict short-term ARs were replicated in the 
increased number of variables that could predict long-term ARs. We were unable to conceive an 
empirical explanation for these anomalies, especially as all the relevant proxies were derived with 
strong literature support.  
 
Three variables, the board’s explicit industry knowledge, the CEO’s tertiary qualifications, and the 
reputation of the board as an industry leader were able to predict short-term post-SEO ARs with 
74.4% accuracy. Four variables, the CEO’s tertiary qualifications, EPS, technology transfer and the 
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adoption of disruptive technology were able to predict long-term post-SEO ARs with 95.3%. 
Surprisingly, two key predictors of short-term ARs, a firm’s reputation, and the number of patents 
lodged were significantly but negatively correlated with long-term ARs.  
The inability of patent lodgements to predict long-term ARs may be partially explained by the 
need to commercialise a patent before it adds to tangible corporate value. The inability of a firm’s 
reputation to advance long-term ARs may lay in the contention that a firm’s reputation may not 
be consistent, i.e., it is only as good as its latest success or failure (Schürmann 2006).  
In a more generalised context, we are unable to explain why so few of the organisation core 
competencies were able to predict abnormal returns, as their relevant proxies were derived with 
strong literature support.  
H1 was not supported: no commonality existed between predictor variables that could predict 
differing measures of financial performance. Rather, it appears that effective predictor variables 
cluster to specific measures of financial performance. 
A more normative approach may shed light on the anomalies described above. By normative, we 
do not mean the ‘rational’ profit maximising behaviour that underpins traditional economic 
equilibrium theory. Subrahmanyam (2010) reported that empirical support for the descriptor 
normative in this sense is ‘quite limited.’ Rather, we mean ‘normative’ theories grounded in 
behavioural finance, such as prospect theory.  
For example, drilling down through our database to an individual case, we 
suggest that behavioural finance narrative may be able to link the linear sequence of waning ARs 
generated by an overly optimistic expectation returns from patents, to the strengthening 
expectations of ARs stemming from an unconnected disruptive technology. 
We conclude that our results strongly support H2. Our short-term ARs predictive equation, based 
on a constant plus a series of discriminative coefficient weighted variable metrics aligned, 
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classified cherries and lemons with 74.4% accuracy. Our long-term AR predictive equation, 
utilising the same stepwise discriminant analysis on a different but more extensive set of 
variables, classified cherries and lemons with 95.3% accuracy.  
Lastly, we suggest that our AR predictive equations may have an applied application and could be 
enhanced by a narrower and tighter grading of the relevant non-parametric independent 
variables.  
This study will assist investors in mitigating information asymmetry to predict cherries versus 
lemons small-cap SEOs based on a set of organisational core competencies. Since all information 
was obtained from public sources, investors can use this model to screen potential investment 
opportunities. If investors (users) focus on the top and bottom third of the ranked investments 
with an appropriate trading strategy, buying the cherries and shorting the lemons, this will 
achieve a superior abnormal return over three years post-SEO. No previous research has 
demonstrated this predictive ability or trading potential. 
Chapter 5:  Summary Thesis Conclusion & Future Directions 
5.1 Motivations 
Our motivations for this multi-faceted research are: 
• To enable small firms, both listed and unlisted, to signal their quality to identifiable
cohorts of professional equity investors, assuming that improved access to funding will
assist in lifting their productivity and creating employment opportunities.
• To provide investors with a viable mechanism to assess the soundness of the financial
performance projections of small-firm equity investments.
• To assist policymakers in legislating for new liquid sources of small-firm equity capital







We linked the above aims in a comprehensive research paradigm, focusing not just into the 
demand for small-scale equity capital, but on the causal factors determining the flow of equity 
investment. We investigated three specific supply sources, the NSX, smaller more agile PE firms, 
and small cap SEOs on the ASX.  
 
5.2  Small-scale private equity: demand versus supply  
We found that involuntary information asymmetry made compelling HGF investments well-nigh 
invisible to professional private equity firms. Similarly, small firms actively seeking equity partners 
were unaware of the existence of small-scale professional private equity firms.  
 
Our interviews revealed that the core motivation of small private equity firms centres on high-
growth returns and a five-year exit plan. We find these small private equity firms do not advertise 
themselves in the aggressive manner that characterises a bank’s modus operandi. We postulate 
that this failure to publicise their services stems from limited investment funds allied to a strong 
latent demand.  
 
The growth objective is achieved by a rigid screening criteria that insists on unequivocable 
evidence the investment target  has a visionary management team in place. The PE firm 
interviewees emphasised that they were not management recruitment firms; the management 
team must have ‘skin in the game.’   
 
The management team must also exhibit outstanding organisational core competencies that 
enable them to act unilaterally, as the PE firms themselves preferred to limit their operational 
involvement to generalised top-down strategic advice. Generic SMEs are a non sequitur with 
small PE firms, as only the highest performance HGFs, characterised by exceptional management 






advised that the number of targeted HGFs that actually met their investment criteria was 
minuscule.  
 
The dictates of economy of scale and agency costs are a further hurdle to small HGFs seeking 
professional equity funding. A minimum investment amount is required to justify the high level of 
agency costs. Most of the smaller PE firms sought to make minimum equity  investments (circa $5 
million),  a far higher amount than most HGFs could justify.  
 
 To the best of our knowledge, the extant literature does not address the profit maximising 
reality, as distinct from the valuation theory of small equity acquisitions. Our practitioner 
evidence suggests that, even if an HGF meets the PE firm’s stringent investment criteria, the 
equity position is likely to be taken on terms debilitating to the acquiree.  
 
The demand for SSPE was considerably higher than expected, suggesting that contemporary 
academic reliance on pecking order theory may not apply to small firms. More than 35% of 
subject HGFs and 18% of subject SMEs who qualified for bank originated debt funding actually 
preferred equity funding. The increased demand for SSPE was partially predicated on the utility of 
strategic management guidance from the private equity investor and the prospect of ongoing 
funding.  
 
 The difficulty in accessing data on smaller firms seeking equity funding was a retardant to our 
research, as was the difficulty of obtaining interviews with the small number of private equity 
firms operating in this market. Even when an interview with the latter was finally granted, most 
interviewees were reticent to discuss their modus operandi in quantitative detail. This reticence 








5.3 Small public listings  
This paper focused primarily on the dehabilitating effect of information asymmetry on small-scale 
equity raisings. Despite the large body of literature devoted to IPOs, there are very few studies 
focused on the performance of secondary exchanges (Rosseau 2007). No study had yet examined 
the NSX’s effectiveness in facilitating Australian SME access to public equity nor had researchers 
previously explored the attitude of Australian accountants and lawyers to their clients 
undertaking an IPO on a secondary exchange. Our published paper filled this gap. 
 
We found that extreme information asymmetry affected relations between the NSX and its 
potential SME clientele. The NSX’s primary function as an equity capital-raising bourse was 
unknown to its SME target market and that market’s primary advisers. As a consequence of  this 
information asymmetry, SME owners and their trusted advisors, including lawyers, accountants, 
and business consultants, did not even consider an IPO on the NSX as an exit pathway or source of 
funding growth.  
 
We discovered that the more knowledgeable institutional funds and HNW investor’s were 
derisive  of the NSXs chronic infrastructure flaws (most notably time delayed and large batch 
trading), and shunned any investment involvement. The result was a dearth of listings 
accompanied by highly illiquid trading patterns. The NSX’s trickle of IPO issuers were forced to 
source their own underwriting in the absence of the deep pools of institutional funds that 
characterise its effective offshore counterparts, the AIM and the TSXVE. 
5.4  Reducing information asymmetry, the performance determinants of small-cap SEOs     
 
The ability to accurately predict stock market returns is a high echelon risk mitigator. Our paper 
delivers a unique set of equations able to accurately predict the likelihood of post-SEO abnormal 
returns. We tested our rudimentary model on companies listed on the S&P/ASX 200 ECI. The 






best of our knowledge, an equation able to predict abnormal returns with a high degree of 
accuracy would be a first. 
 
The SEO research paradigm involved screening a large body of extant literature and extracting 
fifty-four potential causal factors of abnormal returns. Each causal factor was allocated to one of 
five literature sanctioned organisational core competency groups.  
 
The designated five organisational core competency groups were: 
1. The ability to optimise market performance from a given quantum of financial resources.  
2. The quality of governance emanating from the board.  
3. The core management team’s industry specific technological qualifications and 
experience. 
4. The ability to detect and quickly adapt to changing customer needs. 
5. The ability to innovate to competitive advantage.  
 
Interestingly, none of the host of traditional accounting based predictors of ROA were able to 
predict short term (one year post-SEO) ARs. We reasoned that the significant drivers of ARs have 
a non-parametric behavioural input that is not captured by conventional empirical accounting 
measures.  
 
Of the fifty-four independent variables tested, only three, the board’s explicit industry knowledge, 
the CEO’s tertiary qualifications, and the status of the firm as an industry leader, were 
significantly and positively correlated with short-term abnormal returns. The predictive ability of 
these three causal factors was such that they predicted short-term post-SEO abnormal returns 







Contrary to a large extant literature on the positive influence of good governance on financial 
performance, we found strong governance to be a significant negatively related predictor of 
short-term ARs. We postulate that a board obsessed with governance protocols is unlikely to be a 
board focused on the commercial imperative of obtaining a specific industry advantage. 
 
Our equations were able to predict long term (three years post-SEO) with an impressive 95.3% 
accuracy. The only common predictor variable of both short and long-term ARs was a CEO’s 
tertiary qualifications. Two key predictors of short-term ARs, a firm’s reputation, and the number 
of patents lodged were significantly but negatively correlated with long-term ARs. This anomaly 
may reflect the need to successfully commercialise a patent before it has long-term tangible 
value, and that most practitioners are acutely aware that a firm’s historical reputation does not 
guarantee future financial performance. 
 
The three new variables that significantly and positively correlated with long-term ARs included a 
single accounting measure, Earnings per Share (EPS). The remaining two predictors were a 
demonstrated ability to quickly implement new technology and the adoption of a disruptive 
technology (preferably internally gestated). 
 
In summary, we hold that our research materially assists smaller investors to mitigate information 
asymmetry by providing an applied rather than theoretical mechanism able to positively discern 
cherries from lemons.  
 
5.5 Overall contribution of the three studies  
 
Collectively, our three papers break new ground in exploring the adverse effects of information 
asymmetry on the under-researched and policy-neglected smaller end of the equity funding 






at the small end. We contend that with further refinement, the contribution’s predictive equation 
offers a significant commercial application in assisting ‘ordinary’ retail investors. 
 
For example, the relatively new and fast growing  phenomenon of small self-managed super funds 
(SMSFs) now represent almost one third  of Australia’s superannuation funds, yet SMSF managers 
often invest with an information asymmetry-induced ignorance. Their shallow approach 
compares poorly with the intensely developed analytical models for large-cap firms. Our 
predictive equations may assist to close this gap. 
 
Lastly, the wide scope of our mixed methods paradigm contrasts markedly with the empirical 
methodologies that traditionally underpin financial research. We acknowledge that using mixed 
methods was a bold move, but the departure from convention facilitated the inclusion of 
important non-parametric data that would not have been captured by conventional empirical 
methodology.  
 
5.6 Opportunities for future research  
Firstly, given the relatively small number of constituents populating the subject S&P/ASX 
Emerging Companies Index (IEX), an immediate research opportunity exists to verify our two 
predictive equations against a larger Australian population. We suggest further testing them 
against the six-hundred ASX-listed small firms that rank below the IEX. The absence of a 
recognised benchmark index covering these stocks should not be perceived as a barrier, as a 
customised purpose bench mark index can be derived. A small extant literature suggests elegant 
but complex modelling techniques able to accomplish this task (Dor et al. 2008; Fuller et al. 2010). 
The equations could also be tested on a global small-cap exchange such as the London Stock 
Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM). AIM is served by an existing benchmark index, 







Secondly, our table of predictive variables can be refined and expanded. The non-parametric 
independent variables can be classified into more precisely defined subsets, abetted by more 
discriminating measurement techniques. For example, we need to be able to accurately measure 
a firm’s reputation in a manner that can be readily replicated across a subject population. The 
tenets of the emerging discipline of behavioural finance could be also be employed to expand our 
litany of non-parametric abnormal return drivers. 
 
Lastly, Australia needs to urgently address the paucity of small-firm equity investors. Compare the 
deep pool of equity funding available to AIM’s IPOs with that available to Australia’s floundering 
small-cap NSX. An opportunity exists to morph segments of this study into a Government Policy 
paper by quantifying the employment and productivity gains that should flow from improving the 
availability of SSPE to HGFs. Government deregulation of this sector in the US has improved the 
supply of smaller scale Private Equity funding to the extent that the volume of small IPOs has 
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